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The Massachusetts State Police Special Projects Team instituted a new strategy named 
“Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing” late in 2009 in an attempt to address the 
escalation of gang-related violence in the North End of Springfield. The perceived 
success of this initiative has prompted calls for its expansion into other high-crime areas 
of the city. However, there is an undercurrent of concern among critics of the military 
nexus in social science research and application; they warn that applying a 
counterinsurgency approach in domestic law enforcement, regardless of how it is labeled, 
risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Therefore, a current and objective 
analysis of the true effect of the C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing strategy is 
needed before its planned expansion. Research for this thesis utilized a single case study 
limited to quality-of-life indicators before and after the implementation of C3 for the 
gang-related problem. The advantage of this control is that the data spanned from 2007–
2014 as C3 commenced in the fall of 2009. The review of quantitative data collected 
from various police and city sources revealed a neighborhood trending in a positive 
direction since the implementation of C3, but that not all indicators across the board were 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Introduction 
As a result of its drugs- and gang-related violence, in 2011, the city of 
Springfield, Massachusetts was ranked the twelfth most violent city in the United States, 
according to data gathered from the Uniform Crime Report of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).1 The rise in violence followed the inundation of gangs in the city. 
Since 2009, the number of identified organized gangs that have chapters in Springfield 
has risen sharply. In a single year, the number climbed from 28 to 37 gangs, bringing the 
city’s gang membership to more than 2,800 people.2 Arriving around 2009 in the North 
End of Springfield in particular, was a gang called Los Boricuas that came from a 
mountainous region in Puerto Rico and set up criminal operations including rampant 
open air drug markets, strong arm robberies, and intimidation. This led to a turf battle 
between them and the existing local gangs over who would control that territory. It 
culminated in several shootings and murders. This gang was exerting its control through 
intimidation and went so far as to have lookouts riding around on motor scooters with an 
SKS rifle strapped on their backs. Gang members were walking into stores and taking 
whatever they wanted while flashing guns to the clerks. None of these crimes were being 
reported because there was a level of apathy and fear in the community. 
Much like insurgents in a failed state, gangs thrive on community apathy, an 
environment wrought of fear, despair, or indifference in which the population in these 
areas passively permits continued criminal activity and undermines policing efforts. To 
alleviate these conditions, select police departments around the country have begun to 
adapt counterinsurgency (COIN) inspired tactics that are based on several principles, 
including building and maintaining legitimacy within the community, emphasizing 
1 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).  
2 BJA FY 13 Bryne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application,” City of Springfield 
Massachusetts, Springfield, MA, 2013 [submitted to Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of 
Justice], https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/byrne_c3_2.pdf 
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intelligence-driven operations, and focusing on unity of effort among all service 
providers.3 
The Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Special Projects Team instituted a new 
policing method in the fall of 2009, called “Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing,” 
to help address gang crime in the North End of Springfield, one of the most depressed 
neighborhoods of the city. C3 policing was advanced by troopers returning from the 
overseas war on terror with specialized skill sets, adapting COIN principles originally 
developed to battle insurgents by Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to domestically 
target gangs. Based on these principles, C3 aimed to build rapport with the community 
and underscore unity of effort among the community, local police, and state police. 
C3 policing is designed around a campaign plan that utilizes eight building blocks 
as the foundation of the program. These blocks are: gang demobilization, community 
outreach meetings, street leader program, youth and parental workshops, anti-gang 
messaging/information operations, business and community leader development, law 
enforcement and civil community engagements, and law enforcement operations.4 The 
end state of the process, ideally, is a re-shaping of the community environment, which 
makes it inhospitable for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior. 
Research Question 
An objective and current analysis of the true effect of the C3 counterinsurgency 
inspired policing model on the community is needed. Which metrics of change in the 
quality of life within the North End of Springfield most accurately assess the efficacy of 
C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing? More broadly, is there a “flip side of the 




3 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24), (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2006), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf, 23. 
4 “BJA FY 13 Bryne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application,” 15. 
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Problem Statement 
The C3 policing model marks a significant departure from the way policing has 
traditionally been conducted in the North End of Springfield. Past practices of traditional 
and community policing models have been unsuccessful, creating the need for the 
implementation of the C3 model. C3 may, or may not be more expensive to support, but 
it most certainly does require reprioritizing budget decisions and outlays. It could quite 
possibly affect the way the department trains and equips the members or possibly even 
the way officers for certain positions are recruited. Meanwhile, it is yet to be seen 
whether the C3 method of policing has shown convincing, positive, measurable results  in 
terms of the quality of life in this area.  
However, there is an undercurrent of concern among critics of the military nexus 
in social science research and application; they warn that applying a counterinsurgency 
approach in domestic law enforcement, regardless of how it is labeled, risks casting local 
communities as hostile populations. Such overused terms as “the war on crime,” “the war 
on drugs,” or “the war on terror” exacerbate this blurring of the lines and the civil-
military and practical problems that arise in the process. The same is true for the 
journalistic and professional commonplace practice of police calling many urban areas 
combat or war zones.  
Events in Ferguson, Missouri at the time of the writing of this thesis provide an 
opportunity to engage in a public conversation and reflect upon issues like race relations, 
civility, and the kind of communities in which we wish to live. In that case, a young man 
lost his life as the result of a police action, and the response to the ensuing civil 
disobedience by law enforcement has highlighted law enforcement tactics and the 
militarization of the police. How the police respond to large-scale disturbances and 
misinformed perceptions with respect to the 1033 Program, which makes military surplus 
equipment available to local law enforcement agencies, should not be allowed to hijack 
the conversation.5 So before we allow the discussion to be derailed by those engaged in 
lawlessness or by well-intended academics, social activists, or the media, it is time to 
5 Timothy Alben, “The ‘Militarization’ of Police: Another Perspective,” Boston Herald, October 25, 
2014.  
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explore and reveal the perceptions of the public in this community that we are duty-
bound to protect—those who are the real stakeholders.6 
With all this in mind, is it possible to promote a positive collaboration and 
interaction with community leaders and residents with the C3 approach? Does this 
method help or hinder our efforts of providing a safe environment through police-citizen 
partnerships, with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and professionalism?  
Hypothesis 
If the C3 method of policing has been effective in countering gang activity, then 
there should be a measurable change in crime, and the overall quality of life should show 
improvement. To test this hypothesis, data was collected from various published city and 
neighborhood sources to analyze the effects of C3 policing on the community. Indicators, 
such as litter, graffiti, crime statistics, economy, housing, and crime-related medical calls, 
should afford a broader understanding of the actual effects on the community than crime 
statistics alone could provide. Springfield provides a unique research opportunity in this 
regard because it has more than five years of statistical data, raw information, and 
documentation of the implementation of the C3 effort.  
The metrics analyzed thus far have been completely based on quantitative 
indicators. This is typically how COIN-based strategies are graded.7 The recognized 
standard has been using two categories to assess this data. The first is an effects-based 
assessment that requires researchers to track the results of specific events in the target 
area over time and build a picture of campaign momentum. The second is pattern and 
trends analysis that identify various metrics for study and also identifies trends in each 
over time. That is why the metrics for the two years preceding C3 and four to five years 
since the implementation were collected. This classic COIN approach is similar to the 
methods used in this study. It must be remembered though, that the debate continues 
6Ibid.  
7 Mike Few, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars,” Small Wars Journal, April 15, 2011, SJW 
Blog, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/lies-damn-lies-and-metrics-in-small-wars 
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regarding the correct method of analyzing COIN efforts, and no single model has yet 
been deemed appropriate.8  
Reviewing the results of this case study revealed some expected and unexpected 
outcomes. Although there were some clear and definitive trends, there were also 
indiscernible ones as well. Most of the economic and some of the health data were 
unsuccessful in showing positive trends. However, examples of school impacts, such as 
truancy rates and delinquency, show positive signs. Looking at crime through arrests and 
calls for service reveal a neighborhood that is becoming more involved with law 
enforcement and that perhaps trust and legitimacy are indeed being established since the 
implementation of C3. Increased community involvement was also apparent in the 
political realm as the number of registered voters continued to climb; this is sometimes an 
indicator of “voting for a change.” Lastly, positive trends were apparent in both instances 
of graffiti and litter, which indicates that this community is making it less hospitable for 
gang activity to develop and flourish. 
Findings 
Although some argue quite convincingly a contradictory view, the violence, drug 
activity, and criminal behavior that we see in Springfield’s North End do not constitute 
an insurgency. Criminal gangs have no ideology beyond their own profit, no political 
aspirations what so ever, and only achieve passive community support through violence 
or intimidation. Gangs are nothing more than basic criminal entities. Some COIN 
principles and practices can, however, support the current law-enforcement strategy 
aimed to detect, deter, and degrade gangs. The effectiveness of these efforts seem to 
depend more on deepening reciprocal trust and building legitimacy in the police than 
perhaps on the application of all of the lessons learned overseas during the global war on 
terror to Springfield’s inner city neighborhoods. 
Without a doubt, COIN strategy is a military strategy; however, the basic skills of 
working with and through the community, intelligence driving operations, and 
conducting investigations are all fundamental law enforcement practices. Through many 
8 Ibid. 
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conflicts, the military has learned and honed these specific skills, eventually applying 
them with success through their special operations communities (U.S. Army Special 
Forces Green Berets). Now is the time for new ideas, such as C3 policing that examines 
these practices and creates that which has always been missing in community policing: a 
defined strategy to confront criminal street gangs. C3’s COIN gang strategy provides the 
advantage of strong agency and community relationships to identify, target, and remove 
the gangs through the use of intelligence driven operations. When properly administered 
and executed, this strategy of intelligence-driven targeting and operations should be the 
most effective and efficient means to detect, deter, degrade, and dismantle criminal gang 
activity in the city of Springfield. 
Policy Recommendations 
The recent appointment of a new police commissioner in the city of Springfield 
has prompted the request for a city wide expansion of the C3 program. Prior to such a 
commitment by the department, the following recommendations are made based upon the 
information revealed in this thesis: 
Recommendation 
Based upon the findings contained within this thesis, the selection of prospective 
officers for any C3 assignment should take into account the multidisciplinary skills 
required of COIN inspired policing, many of which may not be obtained in traditional 
law enforcement training. The current C3 team was hand selected based upon prior 
experience both in law enforcement and military deployments, language, and technical 
skills. The tasks and organization of the team are unique to the mission, tactical situation, 
and the technical, cultural, and social terrain. Therefore, training should be developed and 
offered to reflect the department’s commitment to this initiative if our expectations are to 
entertain its expansion. Failure to commit the proper personnel with the appropriate 






The research shows that in regard to expanding C3 into new communities, law 
enforcement should seek invitation and permission from the community prior to 
commencing operations. The neighborhood should be the initiator of the contact as 
opposed to being arbitrarily selected by either law enforcement or the city administration. 
The community must have a desired interest in the outcome and be willing to be an active 
participant in the effort. It is imperative to its success that law enforcement is able to 
identify and work with the true local leaders and to enlist the support of local community 
groups. Building legitimacy is crucial to achieving these goals. Ultimately, the ability to 
mobilize the population against the gang problem depends on good relations between the 
community and police. Ideally, the end state of the process is a re-shaping of the 
community environment to make it inhospitable for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal 
behavior.  
Recommendation 
For C3 policing to succeed, a multidisciplinary team of law enforcement, public 
health, public works, school officials, and non-government organizations should be 
assembled and mobilized in the planning phases before operations commence. This 
“working group” should conduct a mission analysis and develop an “implementation 
plan” including, but not limited to, the following: 
• Analyze the community’s concerns 
• Analyze the departments mission, intent, and expectations 
• Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks 
• Determine constraints, prohibitions, and restrictions 
• Construct a timeline with stated goals 
• Develop themes and messages (intra-agency, inter-agency, media, and 
public) 
• Establish course of action evaluation criteria (metrics) 






Critics of the military nexus in social science research and application warn that 
applying a counterinsurgency approach in domestic law enforcement, regardless of how it 
is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Over used terms, such 
as “the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” “the war on terror” add to this perception, as 
do articles quoting police calling many urban areas combat or war zones. It is essential 
we make every effort to promote the positive collaboration and interaction with 
community leaders and residents to promote our message of providing a safe 
environment through police-citizen partnership with an emphasis on mutual trust, 
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As a result of its drug- and gang-related violence, in 2011, the city of Springfield, 
Massachusetts was ranked the twelfth-most violent city in the United States, according to 
data gathered from the Uniform Crime Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI).1 The rise in violence followed the inundation of gangs in the city. Since 2009, the 
number of identified organized gangs that have chapters in Springfield has risen sharply. 
In a single year, the number climbed from 28 to 37 gangs, bringing the city’s gang 
membership to more than 2,800 people.2 Arriving around 2009 in the North End of 
Springfield in particular, was a gang called Los Boricuas that came from a mountainous 
region in Puerto Rico and set up criminal operations including rampant open air drug 
markets, strong arm robberies, and intimidation. This led to a turf battle between them 
and the existing local gangs over who would control that territory. It culminated in 
several shootings and murders. This gang was exerting its control through intimidation 
and went so far as to have lookouts riding around on motor scooters with an SKS rifle 
strapped on their backs. Gang members were walking into stores and taking whatever 
they wanted while flashing guns to the clerks. None of these crimes were being reported 
because there was a level of apathy and fear in the community. 
Much like insurgents in a failed state, gangs thrive on community apathy, an 
environment wrought of fear, despair, or indifference in which the population in these 
areas passively permits continued criminal activity and undermines policing efforts. To 
alleviate these conditions, select police departments around the country have begun to 
adapt counterinsurgency (COIN) inspired tactics that are based on several principles, 
including building and maintaining legitimacy within the community, emphasizing 
1 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).     
2 “BJA FY 13 Bryne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application,” City of Springfield 
Massachusetts, Springfield, MA, 2013 [submitted to Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of 
Justice], https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/byrne_c3_2.pdf 
1 
                                                          
intelligence-driven operations, and focusing on unity of effort among all service 
providers.3 
The Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Special Projects Team instituted this new 
policing method in the fall of 2009, naming it “Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) 
Policing,” to help address gang crime in the North End of Springfield, one of the most 
depressed neighborhoods of the city. C3 policing was advanced by troopers returning 
from the overseas war on terror with specialized skill sets, adapting COIN principles 
originally developed to battle insurgents by Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to 
domestically target gangs. Based on these principles, C3 aimed to build rapport with the 
community and underscore unity of effort among the community, local police, and state 
police. 
C3 policing is designed around a campaign plan that utilizes eight building blocks 
as the foundation of the program: gang demobilization, community outreach meetings, 
street leader program, youth and parental workshops, anti-gang messaging/information 
operations, business and community leader development, law enforcement and civil 
community engagements, and law enforcement operations.4 Ideally, the end state of the 
process is a re-shaping of the community environment, which would make it inhospitable 
for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior.  
The C3 strategy aims to detect, deter, and degrade criminal activity. Legitimacy 
and trust are developed by working with and through the community and empowering 
community members to take ownership of problems and issues that lead to criminal 
activity. C3 policing provides leadership and unity of effort, synchronizing existing local, 
state, and federal resources and directing them at the root causes of criminal activity, 
rather than reacting to the symptoms.  
3 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24), (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2006), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf, 23. 
4 “BJA FY 13 Bryne Criminal Justice Innovation Program: Application,” 15. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
An objective and current analysis of the true effect of the C3 counterinsurgency 
inspired policing model on the community is needed. Which metrics of change in the 
quality of life within the North End of Springfield most accurately assess the efficacy of 
C3 counterinsurgency inspired policing? More broadly, is there a “flip side of the 
COIN”? That is, are there unintended consequences associated with the C3 policing 
model? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is extensive research being conducted at the Common Operational 
Research Environment (CORE) Lab in Monterey, California to determine 
if we can ever accurately measure progress or failure in the application of 
COIN. This type of research is funded throughout the country by grants 
such as the Minerva Initiative, an investment endorsed by the Secretary of 
Defense as a 21st century effort to promote collaboration between the 
military and social sciences to find better solutions in modern conflict. 
This highlights the debate that continues regarding the fact that there is no 
single model deemed appropriate yet to measure the efficacy of COIN 
efforts.5 
Supervisory Special Agent Michael Stansbury, speaking on the seriousness of 
gangs, noted that an estimated one million gang members are infiltrating the nation’s 
communities. The FBI calls them “urban terrorists.”6 Gangs and gang violence are found 
throughout the world, much like radical and extremist groups.7 The philosophy of C3 is 
that there is more convergence across criminal and extremist groups than divergence, and 
that knowledge about the structure and processes of street gangs can inform our 
understanding of extremist groups and vice-versa.  
The C3 policing model marks a significant departure from the way policing has 
traditionally been conducted in the North End of Springfield. Past practices of traditional 
5 Mike Few, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars,” Small Wars Journal, April 15, 2011, SJW 
Blog, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/lies-damn-lies-and-metrics-in-small-wars  
6 Mollie Halpern, and Michael Stansbury, FBI: This Week: Gang Violence (Washington, DC: Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/podcasts/inside/gangs-1.mp3/view    
7 Scott H. Decker, and David C. Pyrooz, “Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country,” 
in Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
129.     
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and community policing models have been unsuccessful, creating the need for the 
implementation of the C3 model. C3 may, or may not be more expensive to support, but 
it most certainly does require reprioritizing budget decisions and outlays. It could quite 
possibly affect the way the department trains and equips the members or possibly even 
the way officers for certain positions are recruited. Meanwhile, it is yet to be seen 
whether the C3 method of policing has shown convincing, positive, measurable results in 
terms of the quality of life in this area.  
However, there is an undercurrent of concern among critics that the nexus of the 
military and social science research and application of military tactics to civilian issues 
who warn that the idea of applying a counter-insurgency approach in domestic law 
enforcement; however, it is labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile 
populations. Such overused terms as “the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” or “the war 
on terror” exacerbate this blurring of the lines and the civil-military and practical 
problems that arise in the process. This is also true for the commonplace practice of 
journalists and professional calling many urban areas combat or war zones.  
Recent events in Ferguson, Missouri at the time of the writing of this thesis 
provide an opportunity to engage in a public conversation and reflect upon issues like 
race relations, civility, and the kind of communities in which we wish to live. In this case, 
a young man lost his life as the result of a police action, and the response to the ensuing 
civil disobedience by law enforcement has highlighted law enforcement tactics and the 
militarization of the police. How the police respond to large-scale disturbances and 
misinformed perceptions with respect to the 1033 Program, which makes military surplus 
equipment available to local law enforcement agencies, should not be allowed to hijack 
the conversation.8 So before we allow the discussion to be derailed by those engaged in 
lawlessness or by well-intended academics, social activists or the media, it is time to 
explore and reveal the perceptions of the public in this community that we are duty-
bound to protect—those who are the real stakeholders.9 
8 Timothy Alben, “The ‘Militarization’ of Police: Another Perspective,” Boston Herald, October 25, 
2014.  
9 Ibid.   
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With all this in mind, is it possible to promote a positive collaboration and 
interaction with community leaders and residents with the C3 approach? Does this 
method help or hinder our efforts of providing a safe environment through police-citizen 
partnerships, with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and professionalism?  
C. HYPOTHESIS 
If the C3 method of policing has been effective in countering gang activity, then 
there should be a measurable change in crime, and the overall quality of life should show 
improvement.  
To test this hypothesis, data was collected from various published city and 
neighborhood sources to analyze the effects of C3 policing on the community. Indicators, 
such as litter, graffiti, crime statistics, economy, housing, and crime-related medical calls, 
should afford a broader understanding of the actual effects on the community than crime 
statistics alone could provide. Springfield provides a unique research opportunity in this 
regard because it has more than five years of statistical data, raw information, and 
documentation of the implementation of the C3 effort.  
A current analysis of C3 policing also is a perfect opportunity to explore the 
“civil-military fusion” that could be blurring the line between the armed forces and the 
police. What could be the legal, social, political, and technical problems? Are there any 
strategic implications of implementing military inspired counter insurgency methods on a 
domestic civilian population? 
Could the results in the North End of Springfield be replicated and rolled out with 
success in other communities? The MSP Special Projects Team was hand selected based 
on prior experience, both in law enforcement, military deployments in support of the 
global war on terror, language, and technical skills. Taking into account the 
multidisciplinary skills required of C3, many of which may not be obtained in traditional 
law enforcement training, could we expect similar results with different personnel in 
5 
every city? Are the measures of success and failure unique to the mission, tactical 
situation, and the technical, cultural, and social terrain?10 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began advising the 
Salinas, California police on counterinsurgency tactics that they could use to combat the 
gang violence problem. Fifteen faculty members and students from the Naval 
Postgraduate School in nearby Monterey went to Salinas to apply what they had learned 
in Baghdad and Fallujah.11 The members of this group did not bring military firepower to 
Salinas, but they did bring first-hand experience and knowledge about combating those 
who would disrupt the peace and safety of residents.  
At the same time on the East Coast, according to the New York Times, troopers 
from Massachusetts introduced Counter Criminal Continuum (C3) Policing, adapted from 
military counterinsurgency tactics, developed, and implemented in order to combat 
rampant gang activity.12 
The field of COIN-inspired policing as it relates to treating gangs as insurgents is 
relatively new. Therefore, this review is an analysis of the most relevant literature in 
which research academics, psychologists, and actual practitioners seek to develop a new 
strategy to combat gang violence and to somehow create a way to measure the success or 
failure of their efforts. 
1. Gangs 
Over the past two decades, a growing concern about organized criminal networks 
has risen within U.S. borders, and it is a threat that communities and law enforcement 
have been slow at detecting. This crisis is constantly evolving and is influenced by 
globalization, war, and immigration. Like a cancer, it metastasizes rapidly and has spread 
10 Borna Dabiri et al., “An Assessment of Counter Insurgency-Inspired Policing Methods in the North 
End of Springfield Massachusetts,” unpublished paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2012. 
11 Karl Vick, “Iraq’s Lessons, on the Home Front: Volunteer Veterans Help California City Use 
Counterinsurgency Strategy to Stem Gang Violence,” The Washington Post, sec. A, November 15, 2009.     
12 Erica Goode, “Combating Gang Warfare with Green Beret Tactics,” New York Times, sec. A, May 
1, 2012.     
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to the major cities, even reaching into rural America.13 These organized criminal 
networks “threaten multiple facets of the United States including the economy and 
National Security.”14 Modern network organizations are mid-level criminal networks, 
something between street gangs and major cartels,15 and these mid-level gangs mirror 
terrorist and insurgent groups in their characteristics.16 These organizations are adaptive 
to opposition, have decentralized leadership, use violence to accomplish their objectives, 
and are constantly growing in sophistication. As the federal government works to develop 
a comprehensive strategy, the day-to-day responsibility falls on state and local law 
enforcement.17 
The Congressional Research Service concluded that law enforcement “plays by 
yesterday’s rules,”18  and the Center for New American Security suggested “to overcome 
this challenge, the United States must not only adopt new approaches but also expand 
those approaches that already work.”19 To overcome these challenges, state and local law 
enforcement must incorporate methodologies of counterinsurgency into traditional law 
enforcement practices in the North End of Springfield, Massachusetts. 
Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises with varying degrees of 
sophistication and reach, gangs, at least some of them, have evolved; they now may 
represent more dangerous and destabilizing actors. In many cities where governance, 
traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded, gangs thrive.  
Transnational gangs can have hemispheric, even global potential. In Future 
Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence, the researcher examines the 
13 Robert B. Killebrew, and Jennifer Bernal, Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security 
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 5.     
14 Kristin M. Finklea, Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), summary page.     
15 John P. Sullivan, “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs, and Intelligence,” Small Wars 
Journal (May 2009), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/future-conflict-criminal-insurgencies-gangs-and-
intelligence     
16 Killebrew, and Bernal, Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security, 6. 
17 Finklea, Organized Crime in the United States, 8. 
18 Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristin M. Finklea, Organized Crime: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. 
Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 1.     
19 Killebrew, and Bernal, Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security, 63. 
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dynamics of crime and war. Specifically, the article provides a framework for 
understanding “criminal insurgencies” where acute and endemic crime and gang violence 
challenge the solvency of state political control.20 
2. Gangs and Terrorists: An Argument for Similarity 
Social identity theory is a social psychological analysis of the role of self-
conception in group memberships, group processes, and intergroup relations. At the start 
of the 1970s in Britain, Henri Tejfel first developed social identity theory out of his 
scientific and personal interest in social perception, social categorization, social 
comparison and prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. It has developed and 
matured, inspiring a prodigious quantity of research.21 Through the emphasis of the 
social identity theory, this literature looks at the dynamics of gang behavior and how they 
could be compared to terrorist groups.  
At first glance, these two factions seem to push the boundaries of comparison, but 
in this analysis, the important similarities are across criminal and extremist groups. Gangs 
and gang violence are found throughout the world, much like radical and extremist 
groups.22 However, surprisingly few studies compare the radicalization of terrorism to 
the joining of organized crime groups or religious sects.23 
Both terrorist groups and street gangs often are self-identified, which means 
legitimacy and identity are not conferred on them by some external body, but rather they 
are self-proclaimed. In addition, membership in both gangs and terrorist organizations is 
an active proposition. One does not become a member by virtue of birth, ethnicity, or 
residency. Instead, one becomes a member through some voluntary act, some act of 
choice. Both types of groups, gangs and terrorist organizations, engage in criminal and, 
20 Sullivan, “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs, and Intelligence.” 
21 Henri Tajfel, and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, eds. William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel (Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1979), 33.     
22 Decker, and Pyrooz, “Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country,” 129. 
23 Alex P. Schmid, and Eric Price, “Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of 
Terrorists: Monographs, Edited Volumes, Grey Literature and Prime Articles Published since the 1960s,” 
Crime, Law and Social Change 55, no. 4 (2011): 339.     
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often, violent behavior. Thus, they operate in an extra-legal environment and maintain an 
adversarial relationship with law enforcement or peacekeeping interests.24 
The thesis examines some of the psychosocial and sociocultural developmental 
theories and research regarding Latino gang members and their involvement in the gangs. 
According to Arfaniarromo, Latino gang member orientation and motivation towards the 
achievement of criminal behavior, largely perceived as deviant by mainstream society, is 
actually an alternative response to repellent conditions.25 Yet another study by Craig 
examined the stability of belonging to a gang in early adolescence, the behavior profiles, 
family characteristics, and friendships of non-gang and gang members. The subjects in 
the present study were originally part of a larger sample of boys. One hundred and forty-
two boys who had a complete data set at ages 11, 12, 13, and 14 were selected for the 
study. The boys were divided into three groups: stable gang members (children who 
belonged to a gang at ages 13 and 14), unstable gang members (children who belonged to 
a gang at either age 13 or 14), and non-gang members. Repeated analyses indicated that 
stable gang members had significantly higher scores than non-gang members on ratings 
of fighting behavior, hyperactivity, inattention, and oppositional behavior as well as self-
reported delinquent activities (drug and alcohol use, stealing, and vandalism).26 
A noted psychologist, Hamden, suggests that a terrorist is an individual who 
carries out or threatens to carry out acts of terror, for hire or not for hire. The act of 
harming or killing others, who are direct enemies or innocent victims, may be for 
monetary gain, gain of group principle, gain of personal principle, or any combination 
thereof. This work is suggestive of similarities between gang members and terrorists. 
According to Hamden, “Terrorist groups provide a close knit family environment, 
meaningful existence, fulfillment of emotional needs, enhanced sense of importance, and 
24 Jessica Glicken Turnley, and Julienne Smrcka, Terrorist Organizations and Criminal Street Gangs 
(Albuquerque, NM: Advanced Concept Group, Sandia National Laboratories, 2002), 53     
25 Albert Arfaniarromo, “Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding of Achievement 
Motivation among Latino Gang Members in U.S. Schools,” Journal of Instructional Psychology 28, no. 3 
(2001): 123.      
26 Wendy M. Craig et al., “The Road to Gang Membership: Characteristics of Male Gang and 
Nongang Members from Ages 10 to 14,” Social Development 11, no. 1 (2002): 53.     
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most of all, a welcoming to the group.”27 Other sociologists and social psychologists, 
such as Stahelski, have discovered that terrorist groups use cult-like conditioning 
techniques to convert normal individuals into remorseless actors. Stahelski suggests 
limited global counter terrorism resources should be focused on the eradication of the 
terrorist group training camps where the conditioning takes place, rather than on trying to 
find terrorists after they have already been conditioned.28 Both suggest that there is more 
convergence across criminal and extremist groups than divergence, and that knowledge 
about the structure and processes of street gangs can inform our understanding of 
extremist groups and vice-versa.  
Many of these same concepts of identity, through self-categorization, that are 
displayed by gang members are also shown by terrorists. Several sources note that 
common characteristics of terrorists as well as gang members include history of 
childhood trauma, family where the father was either absent or estranged, joining of a 
terrorist group was either by default (based on family involvement), peer pressure, or 
little discouragement from surrounding culture and society.29 The literature was thin on 
the places where radicalization is said to take place—prisons, mosques, universities, 
madrassas, diasporas, or the Internet. Schmid and Price stressed alleged triggers of 
radicalization-discrimination, foreign occupation or counter-terrorist over-reaction.30 
Surprisingly, few such studies compare process of radicalization to terrorism to the 
joining of organized crime groups. 
Gang members have an overwhelming sense that society has failed them. So 
when an individual feels like he or she is part of the in-group and is actually being 
accepted, there is a bond and connection that is very hard to break. There is an acquired 
companionship, provided support, respect between peers, cure of loneliness, need for 
glorification, rejection of standard, and security of affection is gained when an individual 
27 Raymond H. Hamden, Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types (Washington, DC: Foundation for 
International Human Relations, 2006), 11.     
28 Anthony Stahelski, “Terrorists are Made Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using Social Psychological 
Conditioning,” Cultic Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2005), 30.     
29 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004), 3.     
30 Schmid, and Price, “Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of Terrorists,” 339. 
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joins a gang.31 Similar to the process self-categorization, terrorists can also attribute the 
self-enhancing aspects of in-group through self-comparison. Terrorists strive for 
belonging and are often joiners who cannot form consistent group identities outside of the 
home.32 The terrorist group provides a close-knit family environment, meaningful 
existence, and fulfillment of emotional needs, enhanced sense of importance, and most of 
all, a welcome into the group.33 The strongest confirmation to a gang member or terrorist 
that he or she is part of the group comes from the acceptance by other existing members 
of the gang or terrorist group.34 This final component pulls together all of the aspects of 
group membership and displays the ultimate enhancement of what being a gang member 
or terrorist entails. 
3. COIN 
This thesis views the counterinsurgency approach as it is presented in military 
documents and the professional literature, especially the new U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3–24)35 and recent studies produced by the Rand 
Corporation. Furthermore, this thesis explores the transfer of COIN theory, strategy, 
technique, and personnel from the military to the police, and vice-versa. A growing 
number of studies analyze specifically how anti-gang efforts in American cities are 
shaping and being shaped by military COIN operations abroad. 
One of the basic building blocks used and “tweaked” for the C3 policing model is 
the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual.36 The military field manual establishes 
doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. It is based on 
existing doctrine and lessons learned from recent combat operations. To make this text 
31 Edmonton Police Service, “Traits of Gang Members,” Edmonton Police Service, accessed 
November 17, 2014, 
http://www.edmontonpolice.ca/CommunityPolicing/OrganizedCrime/Gangs/TraitsofGangMembers.aspx; 
Jean-PhilippeA2, “Profile of a Street Gang Member,” Jean-PhilippeA2, accessed October 14, 2014, 
http://jean-philippea2.blogspot.com/2008/02/profile-of-street-gang-member.html      
32 Borum, Psychology of Terrorism; Stahelski, Terrorists are made Not Born,” 30.  
33 Hamden, Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types, 11. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24). 
36 Ibid. 
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useful to leaders involved in counterinsurgency operations regardless of where these 
operations may occur, the doctrine was made broad in scope and involved principles 
applicable to various areas of operation. It is based on the premise that fundamental to all 
counterinsurgencies is the need to help local authorities establish safety, security, and 
stability because insurgents thrive on chaos and instability.37 
Insurgency is defined as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”38 
Counterinsurgency is “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and 
civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”39 Modern military COIN 
tactics possess a number of primary characteristics, with the legitimacy of the 
government and its role in political, social, and economic development as a primary 
objective. A legitimate government derives its just powers from the governed and 
competently manages collective security and political, economic, and social 
development.  
According to Metz and Millen, “Today the world has entered another period when 
insurgency is common and strategically significant.”40 These new ideas spill over into the 
civilian world brought by the return of veterans to organizations like the police forces, 
some of which have explored the new skill sets and ideas for fighting organized criminal 
groups on home soil. This is the evolution of counterinsurgency policing.  
Retired General and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
David Petraeus, asserts that many people who articulate and apply U.S. policy and those 
who conduct operations in counterinsurgency environments are neither conversant nor 
familiar with the principles of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.41 This is not 
surprising, considering that those subjects have been generally neglected in broader 
37 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Operations (FM 3–07.22), (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army, 2004), iv.    
38 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24), 1–1. 
39 Ibid., 1–1 
40 Steven Metz, and Raymond A. Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: 
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), vi.    
41 Ibid. 
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American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam 
War more than 40 years ago. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual was designed to 
reverse that trend; it was also designed to merge traditional approaches to 
counterinsurgency with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological 
advances and globalization.42 
Petraeus contends that unity of effort on the behalf of the counterinsurgents 
through those responsible for the nonmilitary elements of power is imperative.43 
Political, rather than military, objectives must be retained. The majority of the population 
must recognize the legitimacy of the government and either actively support or at the 
least not hinder the efforts of the counterinsurgents. The analysis of the effect of any 
operation is impossible without understanding the society and culture within which the 
COIN operation occurs. All operations must be shaped by actionable intelligence 
gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible levels. 
According to Petraeus, the isolation of insurgents from their cause and support is 
more effective than killing every insurgent.44 Security must be provided under the rule of 
law. In addition, security provided by a recognized legal system will produce a greater 
level of governmental legitimacy. Furthermore, a commitment to a long-term effort must 
be made and communicated to the populace. An insurgent wins by not losing, but by 
drawing into question the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government.  
Petraeus asserts that terrorist tactics are used in urban areas to sow disorder, incite 
sectarian violence, weaken the legitimate government, intimidate the population, kill 
government officials and leaders of any opposition, intimidate law enforcement and 
military personnel, and drive the government to act in a repressive manner that will create 
support for the insurgency.45 This type of insurgency requires little or no popular support. 
As societies have become more urbanized, this approach has become more effective. In 
locations with well-run security forces, urban insurgencies take on a cellular structure 
42 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24), 1–1. 
43 Ibid., 1–22. 
44 Ibid., 1–23. 
45 Ibid., 1–6. 
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that works along lines of close association, such as family, religion, political party, or 
social group.46 This insurgent model is similar to a domestic criminal street gang.  
But there is criticism of COIN that must be seriously considered. First, the tactic 
provides for only one way to quell insurgencies and deal with the world’s instabilities: 
population-centric counterinsurgency. The FM 3–24 manual offers no other alternatives, 
no other strategies, or methodologies. A short five-line paragraph in Chapter 5 considers 
more limited options.47 This short paragraph should have been turned into half of the 
manual, according to Colonel Gian P. Gentile, director of the Military History Program at 
the United States (U.S.) Military Academy.48 
Second, history has shown that insurgencies can be defeated by means other than 
the population-centric approach. Consider the recent defeat of the Tamil Tigers by the Sri 
Lankan military. Or consider what actually broke the back of the Malayan insurgency in 
the early 1950s, which was not so much the hearts-and-minds persuasion but the hard-
handed use of military force against civilians, combined with a major resettlement 
program.  
A respected counterinsurgency professional in the U.S. Army, Colonel Robert 
Cassidy, said in a widely cited 2004 essay that conducting counterinsurgency warfare 
was “more difficult” than conventional war.49 Another counterinsurgency expert, David 
Ucko, in a recent book on what he calls the “new counterinsurgency era,” argues that 
COIN with all of its associated political and economic tasks is “far more demanding” 
than the relatively simple process of “locating and striking targets.”50  
46 Thomas X. Hammes, Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith 
Imprint, 2006).    
47 Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters 
(Autumn 2009), http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09autumn/gentile.pdf, 
11. 
48 Ibid., 11. 
49 Robert M. Cassidy, “Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare,” Military 
Review 84, no. 5 (2004), 41.  
50 David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 2.  
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Counterinsurgency and current law enforcement practices possess some 
similarities. Community policing, Compliant Statistics (COMPSTAT) and intelligence-
led policing have attributes employed in COIN; conversely, COIN uses some tactics 
similar to these law enforcement techniques. A 2006 study by George Mason University 
found that 60 percent of municipal and county agencies with more than 100 sworn 
officers considered community policing a major part of the organization’s operations.51 
The same study indicated that 31 percent of the same survey group considered 
COMPSTAT a major part of the organization’s operations.52 
Furthermore, identifiable similarities between community policing and 
counterinsurgency exist. COIN stresses the need for decentralized command, flexible 
response to problems, coordination between a wide range of organizations, and the 
establishment of relationships with the citizenry with which military personnel interact. 
All of these techniques are aspects of community policing.53 These techniques are used 
to increase citizen satisfaction, reduce fear and respond to neighborhood problems in a 
flexible fashion, as opposed to a one size fits all manners.  
In Globalization and Insurgency, Mackinlay explains that insurgency thrives in a 
failed government or state, much like gangs thrive on community apathy.54 Weakened 
states provide an environment for loosely organized armed bands to form insurgent 
forces. Urban and economic decay feed the emergence of gangs in the city of Springfield. 
These similarities are what first prompted returning veterans to use skills that they 
learned overseas in the war against insurgencies, to combat gangs in the city. The 
globalization of insurgency leads inexorably to the globalization of counter-insurgency.55 
51 Stephen D. Mastrofski, James J. Willis and Tammy Rinehart Kochel, “The Challenges of 
Implementing Community Policing in the United States,” Policing 1, no. 2 (2007), 225.    
52 Stephen Mastrofski, James Willis, and Tammy Kochel, Compstat and Community Policing: Are 
They Compatible? (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. George Mason University, 2007), 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/willismastrofski%20.pdf, 9. 
53 Ibid., 4 and 7. 
54 John Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, Adelphi Papers, no. 352 (New York: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 93.    
55 Ibid., 100.    
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This is seen as part of the overflow of military methodology into the civilian world of 
policing. 
In Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Bruce Hoffman attempts to 
explain, in counterinsurgency terms, where we went wrong in Iraq and shed light on 
future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.56 Regarded highly in 
this field, Hoffman’s work has had influence on current COIN practitioners and is 
currently being used in the development of C3 policing.  
There is also the extensive research, mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, 
currently being conducted at the CORE Lab in Monterey, California. The debate 
continues regarding the fact that there is no single model deemed appropriate yet to 
measure the efficacy of COIN efforts.57 It is naive to blindly look at collected metrics 
from the occupying force, counterinsurgent force, or host nation in order to gleam the 
current situation.58 
4. Measuring the Impact of C3 Policing 
In order to measure the efficacy of a COIN inspired policing model, an objective 
analysis of the COIN efforts is needed. If the C3 method of policing has been effective in 
countering gang activity, then there should be a measurable change in crime, and the 
overall quality of life should show improvement.  
A study of 71 countries for the period 1960–1985 explored the following 
hypotheses: income inequality, fuelling social discontent, and increases sociopolitical 
instability. Since investment is a primary engine of growth, the paper identified an 
inverse relationship between income inequality and growth.59 This source demonstrates 
the importance of middleclass business ownership and income equality to the stability of 
56 Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2004), 
2.    
57 Few, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars.” 
58 Joshua Thiel, and Joyce Hogan, “Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge 
Analysis Reveals Reality,” Small Wars Journal (April 2011), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-
statistical-irrelevance-of-american-sigact-data-iraq-surge-analysis-reveals-reality      
59 Alberto Alesina, and Roberto Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” 
European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (1996): 1203.    
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any community. It seems plausible that an increase in the number of business 
registrations in the target neighborhood would be one of the indicators that C3 policing 
had improved the economic health of the area. 
In Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control, and Resistance, research explores the ways in 
which producers of contemporary urban graffiti resist the increasing segregation and 
control of urban environments, and shows how graffiti participants undermine efforts at 
control.60 Data comes from four years of fieldwork in Denver, Colorado and research in 
other cities. This study can be used as a measurement of gang activity in any target area. 
Graffiti affects the appearance of a neighborhood and is also important to the function of 
gangs. It is used to mark turf and to encode information, such as where to buy drugs or 
where homicides have occurred. It is a direct measure of gang presence.61 
The city of Springfield engaged the Donahue Institute at the University of 
Massachusetts (UMass) to prepare an assessment of economic needs in Springfield’s low 
and moderate income neighborhoods, strategies to address those needs, and best practices 
for providing economic development services from comparable municipalities. Statistical 
data from this source provided information as “33 percent of Springfield small businesses 
reported that neighborhood crime was the top inhibitor to their growth” and “48 percent 
of respondents reported that theft/petty crime limited the success of their business.”62 As 
such, it might be safe to hypothesize that businesses would suffer in areas with high gang 
presence. 
The North End community in Springfield, Massachusetts is one of many 
communities across the United States that is struggling with how to improve its economic 
health. A thesis written at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Informal 
Microenterprise in the North End Community,” explores the nature of informal economic 
activity, specifically informal microenterprise, present within the North End community 
as a means for understanding its economic reality and supporting its continued 
60 Jeff Ferrell, “Urban Graffiti Crime, Control, and Resistance,” Youth & Society 27, no. 1 (1995), 73. 
61 Ibid., 78.    
62 Michael D. Goodman, and Kate Modzelewski, City of Springfield Economic Assessment Project 
(Hadley, MA: UMass Donahue Institute, 2008), 24.    
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development.63 Data collected from North End business owners suggest that there are a 
number of dynamic yet informal enterprises operating within the community. Informal 
businesses do play an economic role in the community, and many are positioned to 
increase the impacts they have on the North End with goals of growth and 
formalization.64 Information and data contained in this paper helps to better understand 
the North End area and assess the impact of C3 policing on the quality of life. 
An article in the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency shows that 
scholars are paying close attention to incivilities and how they affect citizens’ fear of 
crime.65 A common research finding is that neighborhood incivilities (e.g., abandoned 
storefronts, unkempt lots, litter, noise, bench sleepers, and public drunks) are often as 
powerful in generating feelings of fear as crime itself. The implication is that by 
removing the riffraff from the streets and graffiti from the walls, feelings of fear will be 
reduced. Moreover, community “clean-sweeps” will meet with public approval as they 
improve the overall quality of life in cities and neighborhoods. This article examines the 
influence of a number of social and physical incivilities on two different reactions to 
crime—perceptions of risk and feelings of fear. The data revealed significant 
relationships between social and physical incivility and perceptions of risk; incivility is 
also related to fear but less strongly so. To the extent that incivility is predictive of fear, 
its causal effect is mediated almost entirely through perceptions of risk to crime.66 
The question of whether living in a disadvantaged neighborhood damages health, 
over and above the impact of personal socioeconomic characteristics, is probed in 
Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Health.67 The researchers hypothesize that 
(1) health correlates negatively with neighborhood disadvantage adjusting for personal 
63 Tara Kumar, Informal Microenterprise in the North End Community (Springfield, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004), http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17696    
64 Ibid.    
65 Randy L. LaGrange, Kenneth F. Ferraro, and Michael Supancic, “Perceived Risk and Fear of 
Crime: Role of Social and Physical Incivilities,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 29, no. 3 
(1992): 311. 
66 Ibid.    
67 Catherine E. Ross, and John Mirowsky, “Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Health,” 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior 42, no. 3 (2001): 272.    
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disadvantage; (2) neighborhood disorder mediates the association; (3) this circumstance 
arises partly because disorder and the fear associated with it discourage walking; and (4) 
partly because disorder, disadvantage, and fear directly impair health. The daily stress 
associated with living in a neighborhood where danger, trouble, crime and incivility are 
common apparently damages health.68 
Yet another study reported a reverse association between fear of crime and mental 
and physical health.69 Fear of crime was associated with poorer mental health, reduced 
physical functioning on objective and subjective indicators, and lower quality of life. In 
the study, participants reporting greater fear exercised less, saw friends less often, and 
participated in fewer social activities compared with the less fearful participants. 
Curtailed physical and social activities helped explain the link between fear of crime and 
health. The researchers concluded that fear of crime may be a barrier to participation in 
health-promoting physical and social activities.70 This association between the fear of 
crime and mental health is another method to measure the efficacy of C3 policing on the 
quality of life issues in the North End. Researching medical calls for service over the 
implementation time of the C3 initiative could be one metric. 
Finally, the broken windows theory states that monitoring and maintaining urban 
environments in a well-ordered condition may prevent further vandalism as well as an 
escalation into more serious crime.71 “Broken Windows” finally acknowledged the 
connection between disorder, fear, crime, and urban decay that has been playing out in 
America’s cities for decades.72 The authors show that the key to reducing crime is the 
restoration of order. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Mai Stafford, Tarani Chandola, and Michael Marmot, “Association between Fear of Crime and 
Mental Health and Physical Functioning.” American Journal of Public Health 97, no. 11 (2007): 2076.   
70 Ibid.    
71 James Q. Wilson, and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety,” Atlantic Monthly 249, no. 3 (1982): 30.    
72 Ibid., 32.    
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5. The Flip Side of the COIN 
In Our Enemies in Blue, the chapter titled “Your Friendly Neighborhood Police 
State” is devoted to the argument that the two major developments in American policing 
since the 1960s—militarization and community policing—are actually two aspects of a 
domestic counterinsurgency program. The idea was summed up with a simple equation: 
Community Policing + Militarization = Counterinsurgency.73 
There are other recent pieces of literature that also raise this sentiment. For 
example, War by Other Means states that  law enforcement “capabilities”  are 
“considered to be high priority”74 in COIN: “well-trained and well-led community police 
and quick-response, light-combat-capable (constabulary) police.” Also referenced many 
times in this thesis is a Joint Special Operations University report, Policing and Law 
Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line. The report states:  
The predominant ways of utilizing police and law enforcement within a 
COIN strategy . . . consist of the adoption of the community-policing 
approach supported by offensive-policing actions such as paramilitary 
operations, counter guerrilla patrolling, pseudo-operations [in which state 
forces pose as insurgent groups], and raids.75  
Meanwhile, this thesis joins a growing body of literature that argues that gang 
violence should be treated as a type of insurgency. However, in the application of the 
techniques and strategies of counterinsurgency to counter-gang campaigns, the state 
might inadvertently suggest that there is a political dimension to gangs. 
By applying the COIN philosophy in a domestic setting, the government concedes 
that its legitimacy is being challenged and that the challengers are rivals, or potential 
73 Kristian Williams, Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull 
Press, 2004), 255.    
74 David C. Gompert, and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means—Building Complete and Balanced 
Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), xlv.    
75 Joseph D. Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line (Hurlburt Field, 
FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2009), 40.    
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rivals, with independent claims to legitimacy and distinct spheres of influence.76 John 
Sullivan, a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy, writes in one RAND report:  
[S]ome [gangs] have begun to adopt varying degrees of political activity. 
At the low end, this activity may include dominating neighborhood life 
and creating virtual ‘lawless zones,’ application of street taxes, or taxes on 
other criminal actors. At the high end, some gangs have active political 
agendas, using the political process to further their ends and destabilize 
governments.77 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research for this thesis utilized a single case study regarding the Massachusetts 
State Police introduction of a counterinsurgency inspired form of policing in the North 
End of Springfield, Massachusetts to combat criminal gang activity. The time frame of 
this study was limited to quality-of-life indicators before and after the implementation of 
C3. The advantage of this control is that the data spanned from 2007–2014 as C3 
commenced in the fall of 2009. The disadvantage is that C3 may not have been the only 
factor that affected metrics during that time. To isolate the effects of other factors, the 
North End was analyzed relative to the entirety of the city of Springfield. This step 
permitted the isolation of citywide trends.  
This case study evaluated distinct metrics that determine changes in the quality of 
life within the North End by analyzing issues of health, economy, education, housing, 
crime, and community. The sources of this data were internal State Police and Springfield 
Police Department records and reports, literature on local urban studies and planning, 
local hospital and private ambulance records, information provided by way of records 
from various city department and agencies, local and national media, online real estate 
resources, and military training manuals and field manuals. Though there were some 
categories that were inconclusive, most indictors support the fact that C3 has had a 
76 Kristian Williams, “The Other Side of the COIN: Counterinsurgency and Community Policing,” 
Interface 3, no. 1 (2011): 99.    
77 John P. Sullivan, “Gangs, Hooligans, and Anarchists-the Vanguard of Netwar in the Streets,” in 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, ed. John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 102.    
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positive influence on their immediate target area. The problem is in how to replicate 
those results in other neighborhoods within Springfield.  
Looking at other high crime areas around the country such as Flint Michigan, 
Chicago Illinois, and Oakland California, law enforcement is applying the same old 
traditional policing tactics. For example, in Chicago this past Fourth of July weekend, 
there were approximately 82 shootings and 14 murders over that four day weekend.78 
Yet, law enforcement continues to deploy the same tactics, flooding the area with more 
officers and patrol cars, perhaps convening a task force, but it is not changing the 
landscape of inner city American policing. So this leads to the question of “where is the 
innovation” in urban policing in America? C3 offers a strategy that quite possibly could 
be the answer. 
78 Peter Nickeas, “Fourth of July Weekend Toll: 82 Shot, 14 of Them Fatally, in Chicago,” Chicago 
Tribune July 07, 2014.    
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II. GANGS, TERRORISTS, AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITY 
THEORY 
A. AN ARGUMENT FOR SIMILARITY 
Gangs and gang violence are found throughout the world, much like radical and 
extremist groups.79 As Schmid and Pierce noted, “Surprisingly few studies compare 
radicalization to terrorism to the joining of organized crime groups or religious sects.”80 
This chapter is an exploration of the validity of an analogy between street gangs and 
terrorists. Through the emphasis of the social identity theory, this chapter will look at the 
dynamics of gang behavior and how it could be compared to a form of terrorism in the 
United States. 
My central argument is that there is more convergence across criminal and 
extremist groups than divergence, and that knowledge about the structure and processes 
of street gangs can inform our understanding of extremist groups and vice versa. 
Tempered with the knowledge that there are points of convergence across these groups, it 
is important to understand and respect the differences between these groups. This 
argument is an analysis that bolsters my thesis that counter insurgency tactics can be 
modified to successfully disrupt, degrade, and deter gang violence in an urban setting. 
B. BACKGROUND 
For the purposes of this comparison, the term “terrorism” will be defined as an act 
of violence or threat of violence carried out by an individual or group of individuals 
against members of a negatively referenced, contrasting group.81  
Social identity theory is a general theory of self that can be examined through 
three different components, the concept and bases of identity, the activation of identities 
79 Decker, and Pyrooz, “Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country,” 129. 
80 Schmid, and Price, “Selected Literature on Radicalization and De-Radicalization of Terrorists,” 339. 
81 Hamden, Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types. 
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and identity salience, and the cognitive and motivational process.82 These core 
components reveal the dynamics of gangs and terrorist groups. 
In order to justify and rationalize the use of military inspired counterinsurgency 
techniques in an urban environment, there must be an investigation into the validity of an 
analogy between gangs and terrorists. Failure to win that argument would render the rest 
of this thesis invalid. There are strong constituents to both side of the argument. The most 
glaring difference is that terrorists have a political agenda whereas gangs do not, but how 
they operate is similar. Both groups want to operate in failed states or areas. The 
insurgent operates in failed areas such as Syria, places in Africa, Yemen, or Somalia 
where there is lawlessness. They want to move into these areas because they can open up 
their training camps or operation centers and run missions from there, and there is no fear 
of reprisals.  
The same holds true for drug dealers and gang members. They want to move into 
a neighborhood that has failed, where they know that the community is not going to pick 
up the phone and engage the police—where there is no fear of reprisals. These conditions 
allow the gangs to work within the passive support of the community.  
For the most part, neither group is actively supported by the community. The 
actual active support is very small, but the passive support is more important than the 
active support. An example of active support would be if a gang member was running by 
a house, gave another his gun to hide, and when the person was questioned by the police, 
he/she would not disclose that she or her had had seen the perpetrator. However, the 
majority of the population,  displays passive support; they know who are gang members, 
know who sells drugs, knows where they keep the drugs, and knows what kind of car 
they drive, but they never picks up the phone to call the police. Or when the police do 
come by and question them about gang members, they respond that they have no idea 
about anything. Gang members know this and that is why they operate in those areas. 
They know that passively, the community is not going to “rat” them out.  
82 Jan E. Stets, and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology 
Quarterly (2000): 224.    
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Passive support is not so much out of fear of reprisals from the gangs or terrorists 
as it is a very powerful established norm or moray within the community. It is a cultural 
thing where populations are born into this understanding that if someone with whom one 
has grown up or has a place in that community is selling drugs or is a member of an 
insurgency, there is a tacit understanding or messaging that one does not “rat” him out to 
the police. It is very powerful and the gang members and terrorists know this, and they 
use it as an intimidation tool to label others as a “rat” causing such deep shame that it will 
force people to “clam up.” But when the onion is peeled back, there is very rarely 
physical retaliation on that person. In sum, the similarities are in the way that they 
operate in failed environments, and how they survive off of passive support. How they 
differ, is in their political ends. 
So what is at stake? The population is. That is how the gang members or 
insurgents win. If they win over the community or terrorize members to the point where 
they do not want to say anything, the insurgents, or gang members, have won. Even if the 
community does not like them or is fearful of them, they have established control over 
the community. So the best hope at law enforcement or police success is to mobilize the 
community willfully against the nefarious actors because it will not last if the community 
is strong armed by the police into giving up information. The community members need 
to voluntarily buy into the messaging, and, on their own, decide that they do not want the 
gangs or terrorists in their community. 
C. STRUCTURES AND IDENTITIES 
Both terrorist groups and street gangs often are self-identified, that is, legitimacy 
and identity are not conferred on them by some external body (i.e., they do not need to be 
“recognized” by a larger community in order to act). Rather, members and groups are 
self-proclaimed. For the social identity theory, the concept of identity is by a category or 
group. The identity is constructed when a person acknowledges that he or she belongs to 
a social category or group. A social group is often defined as a set of persons who view 
themselves as members of the same social category and hold a common social 
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identification.83 Self-categorization is the process in which the individual impulsively 
categorizes, classifies, or names him or herself, in a way that relates to other social 
classifications. Membership in both gangs and terrorist organizations is an active 
proposition. One does not become a member by virtue of birth, ethnicity, or residency. 
Rather, one becomes a member through some voluntary act, an act of choice.  
The social category to which people assign themselves to is based on parts of the 
structured society that is already in existence; individuals are born into an already 
structured society.84 Of course, it is through the unique combination of different social 
categories off of which the person bases his or her social concept of identity.85 An 
example of self-categorization in the context of gang members would be through culture 
or community, and family or peer influence. Culture is part of a structured society that 
has been found to be intertwined with the development of self-identity. It is also possible 
that the community a person is born into is an unstable condition or in the state of 
anomie.86 When there is an imbalance between the socially acceptable goals and the 
available means in which one is to obtain those goals, an individual can be affected by 
this condition. As a result, one may seek familiarity through the only means possible, a 
gang, as an effort in strengthening their identity and attempting to reach out to the 
traditional culture. There is also a tendency for the community to stem a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of an individual, which increases their self-identity to be centered on that of a 
gang member 
Another structured society that precedes the individual is the family. Individuals 
whose families have minimal levels of socialization and who put little emphasis on the 
expression of affection and emotions between one another have an increased likelihood 
of becoming a gang member, compared to their counterparts. An individual who is part of 
a family unit, who lacks supervision, for one reason or another, also has a greater 
83 Ibid., 226. 
84 Ibid., 225. 
85 Ibid., 229. 
86 Arfaniarromo, “Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding,” 19. 
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tendency to affiliate his or her self-identity with that of a gang member.87 Youth gang 
members are allowed to go unsupervised by parents who are either absent or naïve. A 
study revealed that the alienation from parents and the family was the initial cause for an 
individual to turn to gang involvement.88 The study also established lack of a male figure 
and rejection by the family as related characteristics of gang members.89 
There is also an intense pressure put upon an individual by their peers. When the 
structured society through peer influence makes being a gang member seem glamorous 
and successful, then there is an increased likelihood that the individual will be influenced 
into becoming a gang member. Another influence on an individual that is part of the 
environment he or she is born into is the media. Gang violence is portrayed as being 
acceptable and as a valid means to an end through television, movies, and music. 
External influences also have an impact on the development of crime and delinquent 
related motivations and direction.90  
It is interesting to note that many of these same concepts of identity, through self-
categorization, that are displayed by gang members are also shown by terrorists. 
Common characteristics of terrorist include history of childhood trauma; family where 
the father was either absent or estranged; joining of terrorist group was either by default 
(based on family involvement), peer pressure, or little discouragement from surrounding 
culture and society.91 Both types of groups (gangs and terrorist organizations) engage in 
criminal and, often, violent behavior. They thus operate in an extra-legal environment 
and maintain an adversarial relationship with the forces of law, order, or peace. 
In self-comparison, an individual categorizes him or herself as the in-group, by 
having similarities, and sees others as the out-group because they differ from his or her 
self-identity. It is through the social comparison methods that one may feel self-
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Craig et al., “The Road to Gang Membership,” 54. 
90 Arfaniarromo, “Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding,” 128. 
91 Hamden, Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types. 
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enhancing results.92 It is through the self-comparison method that one derives a positive 
experience from gang involvement. As a gang member, the fulfillment of traditional 
achievements may be lacking, but that often means that sense of accomplishment is 
obtained by other means. A different form of socialization is sometimes developed 
through the inner workings of a gang and sometimes by means of deviant or criminal 
behavior.93 Satisfaction that was missing from accepted social groups, such as school 
participation, is not obtained through the lifestyle of a gang member. The terrorist may 
also not feel connected to say his parents messaging or culture; therefore, he may become 
disenfranchised and ripe for radicalization. The social span for the terrorist could range 
from a dirt farmer to a college graduate. But this same subject may walk into a mosque 
and be told by the iman that Allah has called him for great things and tailor whatever 
message the radical entity chooses. Like the gang member, initiates are separated from 
the community by the hope of a new sense of belonging and support. 
The gang comes to represent a surrogate for the member’s biological family. 
When gang members form this type of kinship with one another, the fulfillment of being 
part of the in-group is so strong that the gang has effectively over-taken the place of the 
family.94 Since the gang involvement is granting the subject with positive emotions, the 
ideals of parents or society is outweighed.95 Some gang members may feel that society 
has failed them. So when subjects begin to feel like they are part of the in-group and are 
actually being accepted, there a bond forms and the connection is very hard to break. 
There is an acquired companionship, provided support, respect between peers, cure of 
loneliness, need for glorification, rejection of standard, and security of affection is gained 
when an individual joins a gang.96  
Similar to the gang process self-categorization, terrorists can also attribute the 
self-enhancing aspects of in-group through self-comparison. Terrorists strive for 
92 Stets, and Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” 225. 
93 Arfaniarromo, “Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding,” 131. 
94 “Gangs Psychology,” SocialPC, accessed August 19, 2013, 
http://www.socialpc.com/SocialIssues/Gangs.html      
95 Ibid.  
96 Jean-PhilippeA2, “Profile of a Street Gang Member.”  
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belonging and are often joiners who cannot form consistent group identities outside of the 
home.97 The terrorist group provides a close knit family environment, meaningful 
existence, the fulfillment of emotional needs, enhanced sense of importance, and most of 
all, a welcoming into the group.98 
The phenomenon of self-identity through the group-based identification is the 
most influential bases for participation in group behavior. This level of commitment and 
attraction to the in-group is often how gangs and terrorists recruit and keep their 
members. Since members can be of any race, ethnicity, sex, and location, it is the 
prominent identification that influences the behavior of a member. 
According to a study by Arfaniarromo, gang members tend to commit more 
crimes and engage in a variety of different forms of delinquency at a higher rate than the 
general population.99 Arfaniarromo’s study, “Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural 
Understanding of Achievement Motivation among Latino Gang Members in U.S. 
Schools,” found that stable gang members engaged in more fighting behaviors then the 
non-gang members, have more contact with the police, and are responsible for a more 
proportionate amount of crime; also, stable gang members reported their friends as being 
more aggressive and engaging in delinquent behaviors.100 In addition, observations of 
gang members at an early age revealed when gang members dress according to the 
specifics of the gang, are awarded nicknames, and own a weapon this also increases one’s 
bases of identity with the group.101  
Terrorists also display these same characteristics. Similarly to gang members, 
terrorist have no gender, race, or national limitations; they partake in actions of the gang, 
such as giving up their civilian clothes and any behavior patterns that are not conforming 
97 Anthony Stahelski, “Terrorists are Made, Not Born,” Journal of Homeland Security (March, 2004): 
30; Borum, Psychology of Terrorism.     
98 Hamden, Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types. 
99 Arfaniarromo, “Toward a Psychosocial and Sociocultural Understanding,” 123. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Jean-PhilippeA2, “Profile of a Street Gang Member.” 
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to the terrorist group; and have an increased commitment to the group through the 
continuation of terrorists behaviors and actions.102 
The activation of identities and identity salience is the next component to the 
social identity theory. The perception and behavior of the gang or terrorist member has 
increased and reached a point of no return, when the individual is now making his or her 
own decisions as to how to react in certain situations. At this point, the group 
involvement and acceptance has become a necessity to the member’s life. 
The final component of the social identity theory is the cognitive and motivational 
process. The cognitive process, also known as depersonalization, is when an individual 
sees him or herself as the in-group prototype rather than as an individual. The 
depersonalization process of an individual as a member of a group includes the aspects of 
identification with a category or group and the behavior that is associated with that 
category or group.103 The strongest confirmation to a gang member or terrorist that he or 
she is part of the group comes from the acceptance by other existing members of the gang 
or terrorist group.104  
D. THE C3 CONNECTION 
Gang members and gang activity can be seen as a form of terrorism in the United 
States. The comparison of gangs to terrorist groups highlights the similarities and 
differences between the groups and increases our ability to develop effective responses 
such as C3 policing. There is merit in comparing gangs to terrorist networks on the basis 
of their structure, processes, cultural orientations and activities. 
In one of the few pieces to consider the topic, Curry examined the relationships 
between gangs and terrorist groups.105 The members of both groups are primarily male, 
violence is common in both groups, solidarity and elements of collective behavior 
102 Hamden, Psychology of Terrorists: 4 Types, 32. 
103 Stets, and Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” 231. 
104 Ibid. 
105 G. David Curry, Richard A. Ball, and Robert J. Fox, Gang Crime and Law Enforcement 
Recordkeeping. (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of 
Justice, 1994).   
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operate in both groups, and the violence used by both groups often represents a form of 
“self-help,” or attempts to redress wrongs. The differences included a profit motive for 
gangs that is largely absent for terrorist groups, cross-national connections maintained by 
terror groups, the diversity in different types of crime that typifies gang crime, and an 
ideological belief among members of terror groups that is not present among gang 
members. Most of the similarities between the groups reflect the fact that terrorist groups 
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III. SPRINGFIELD AND THE NORTH END  
To understand the growing gang problem of Springfield, it is important to 
examine the problems of the city within a historical framework.107 The city of 
Springfield in the 1950s and 1960s was by all accounts a manufacturing town. Many of 
the largest employers in the city, including the Springfield Armory and Smith & Wesson, 
relied on the city’s highly skilled workforce to generate revenue.108 But by the late 1960s 
and 1970s, many of these businesses left Springfield in search of more favorable tax and 
labor conditions.109 To more complicate the matter, in 1968, the federal government 
closed the Springfield Armory. This loss of industry dealt a significant blow to the city 
and was the first of many events that precipitated an era of decline. From 1970 to 2000, 
the percentage of the population employed by the manufacturing industry decreased by 
more than half. As the city’s unemployment rate rose, the poverty rate increased from 13 
percent in 1970 to 20 percent by the year 2000.110  
The city’s problems, and especially those of the North End neighborhood, were 
amplified by the construction of Interstate 91 (I-91) in the 1960s, which impeded access 
to the river front, some of the city’s most economically valuable land. Once, as part of the 
city of Springfield’s Urban Renewal Plan, city planners lobbied for I-91 to be constructed 
along the riverfront because they believed that the river had become too polluted and that 
I-91 would catalyze economic growth.111 In the event, however, I-91 blocked access to 
107 This chapter reflects data and information I collected to check past results and add current data to 
an unpublished case study done by Harvard students in 2012. I am unable to cite specific pages and 
narrative, as all I could obtain was a draft copy. Dabiri et al., “An Assessment of Counter Insurgency-
Inspired Policing Methods.” 
108 Mark Muro et al., Reconnecting Massachusetts Gateway Cities: Lessons Learned and an Agenda 
for Renewal (Boston, MA: MassINC and Brookings Institute, 2007), 20.    
109 “Chap. 0169—An Act Relative to the Financial Stability in the City of Springfield,” State Library 
of Massachusetts, 2004, http://hdl.handle.net/2452/122220   
110 DeAnna Green, “Springfield, Massachusetts: Old Hill, Six Corners, and the South End 
Neighborhoods,” in The Enduring Challenge of Concentrated Poverty in America: Case Studies from 
Communities across the U.S., ed. David Erikson et al. (Washington, DC: Federal Reserve System and the 
Brookings Institution, 2008), http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/cp_fullreport.pdf, 136.   
111 Diana Bernal et al., A Plan for the North End Campus (Cambridge, MA: MIT Department of 
Urban Studies and Planning, 2004), 14. 
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the river and had the unintended consequence of splintering communities like the North 
End. Thus, the highway came to represent the city’s most unsuccessful effort at urban 
renewal.  
The ensuing decline prompted many middle-class residents to leave the city for 
the surrounding suburbs.112 This departure was accompanied by an influx of Hispanic 
migrant workers, particularly during the 1970s. Many were lured by relatively affordable 
housing and farming employment opportunities. Today, Springfield, which was once a 
predominately white city, has equal proportions of Hispanics and Caucasians.113 The 
populations are noticeably separated by neighborhoods within the community and are 
ethnic based. 
As the demographics of the city shifted, political power was slowly transferred 
from the city to the state government. Bad decision making on the part of city 
government in the early 2000s resulted in fiscal deficits that forced the state to assume 
financial responsibility.114 The ensuing result was the State Secretary of Finance and 
Administration establishing the Financial Control Board (FCB) that was tasked with 
administering a loan of $52 million while devising a strategy to cut the city’s deficit.115 
Meanwhile, the National Urban Land Institute (ULI) was hired to develop the “Plan for 
Springfield,” in an attempt to reduce citywide crime and devise plans for the city’s 
revival.116 Then, in 2012, Mayor Domenic Sarno replaced the ULI’s plan with a privately 
funded project called “Rebuild Springfield.” Since it was one of the most economically 
challenged neighborhoods in the city, the North End received federal, state, and city aid 
to revitalize its rebirth.  
112 David M. Ahronian et al., Making Connections-Envisioning Springfield’s North End, Paper 4. 
2009. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/larp_grad_research/4/, 10.    
113 Green, “Springfield, Massachusetts: Old Hill, Six Corners, and the South End Neighborhoods,” 
137. 
114 “Chap. 0169—An Act Relative to the Financial Stability in the City of Springfield.” 
115 Ibid.  
116 David B. Panagore, Springfield: Strategies for a Sustainable City (Springfield, MA: Urban Land 
Institute, 2006), 22 
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Springfield’s North End, an economically depressed area and the target for the C3 
policing initiative, is made up of two neighborhoods separated by I-91: Brightwood and 
Memorial Square. Of the 11,000 residents in the North End, more than 75 percent are of 
Puerto Rican heritage. Economic activity, which is made up primarily of retail and 
service industries, is focused on Main Street in Memorial Square. In contrast, the 
Brightwood section of the North End is primarily residential.117  
A. MEASURING THE IMPACT, A CASE STUDY OF C3 
Gangs and gang violence are nothing new to the North End. A particularly violent 
gang, the Las Boricuas, moved into the North End in 2009 and began to seize control 
over the local drug trade.118 Almost all of the other gangs in the North End are 
characterized as “posses,” which are loosely organized sects made up of mostly of young 
males, 14–19 years of age,119 and are defined by kinship to operate near their base of 
passive support.  
There are basically four levels of organized gangs in the United States. There are 
posses, neighborhood based street gangs, regional gangs, and national gangs. Posses tend 
to be younger males, loosely organized, who grew up as friends, smaller in their numbers, 
with no distinct hierarchy or “shot callers.” They are usually friendship or kinship based. 
It is not based on the neighborhood proper. So if these particular members were moved, 
they would still be a gang; whereas a neighborhood street gang is identified by its street, 
neighborhood, or block. The posse really identifies more with each other and are distinct 
to each other. The posse member tends to be more violent because they are younger and 
trying to “make their bones” or establish a reputation as a hard core kid despite their 
young age. Now-a-days, tough guys are not established by a fist fight, they “make their 
bones” by doing shootings or strong arm robberies.  
117 Shiben Banerji et al., Building in the Present, Growing towards the Future: A Plan for Economic 
Development in the North End (Cambridge, MA: MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 2005), 
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/urban-studies-and-planning/11-945-springfield-studio-fall-
2005/projects/finalreport.pdf, 49.    
118 Michael Cutone, “U.S. Attorney Gang Prevention Summit Presentation,” presentation, 
Massachusetts State Police Department, Springfield, MA, 2013. 
119 Curry, Ball, and Fox, Gang Crime and Law Enforcement Recordkeeping, 10.    
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The “shot caller” is typically a ranking system within a national gang. The “shot 
caller” is the one who doles out the punishment or approves violence against another. In 
this system, one has to go through the hierarchy and get approval before acting. This does 
not occur in posses. If a member within a posse has a particular beef with someone, he or 
she can just go ahead and shoot that person without having to check with anybody.  
Therefore, it was difficult for traditional law enforcement in the North End to 
combat crime due to the lack of structure within the posses. Tradition policing in this area 
was based upon the FBI model of multiple street level narcotic buys, getting informants 
into the group, moving higher up the structure, and attacking the gang unit in that way. 
But it fails against these types of group because there is no boss, similar to the insurgents 
“leaderless resistance.” There is no command structure and in the long term; there is no 
strategic change in the gang’s environment. Traditionally, police would typically flood 
and area, make a lot of arrests and that would suppress the gangs for a while. Even if all 
the gang members were locked up, the conditions were still ripe for another group to 
move in and restore criminal operations.  
As a metaphor, picture the target area as a beach, and seagulls as gang members 
or insurgents. Say that a hundred seagulls land on the beach and a person comes along 
with a Labrador retriever, which represents the traditional police officer. That Labrador 
runs down the beach and all the seagulls take flight. But after his eight-hour patrol, the 
Labrador leaves, and the seagulls return to the beach. Even if the Labrador catches a few 
seagulls and continues to do so for a few days, they still return. 
So law enforcement has a press conference with the mayor, complete with a 
PowerPoint presentation showing how many bad guys were captured, but what was 
actually done to change the actual conditions on the ground? Nothing. So what C3 
policing does is explore what needs to be done to make the beach different and more 
difficult for the seagulls to land. It does not mean that one will completely eliminate the 
seagulls, but instead of having a 100 landing, now maybe only 50 land. The goal is to 
make it harder for the seagulls to land when the Labrador is gone. Certain conditions or 
obstacles have been created on the beach so that when the seagulls come, they decide to 
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go elsewhere, where it is easier to do what they want to do. That is counterinsurgency, 
changing the conditions so that it is no longer ripe for that behavior. 
Change that metaphor so that the beach is now the population. How is it that the 
population can be won over to where they won’t passively allow the gangs there 
anymore? The bottom line is this—one must change the environment that allows the 
behavior. Therefore, C3 in the North End focused on detecting, disrupting, degrading, 
and dismantling criminal activity. More specifically, according to the mission statement 
of the MSP Special Projects Team, it aimed to separate gangs from their cause and 
support.120 
If the C3 policing method, which started in 2009, has been effective in countering 
gang activity in the North End of Springfield, then measures of crime and quality of life 
should show improvement. Measurement of the overall effectiveness of C3 was sought 
by examining specific indicators of changes in the quality of life within the North End. 
These categories included health, economy, education, politics, housing, crime, and 
community.121  
1. Medical Calls Related to Criminal Acts 
One clue as to the quality of life in a given community is the health of the people 
living there. Health can be affected by local crime rates since crime and the fear of crime 
are directly correlated with increased anxiety and decreased physical activity (for 
example, walking and exercising).122 Therefore, being exposed to the disorder that goes 
with crime can have a negative impact on one’s health. Living in a neighborhood that has 
120 Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “What is C3 Policing?,” accessed September 22, 
2014, http://mspc3policing.com/?page_id=800 
121 To accurately interpret data, a control group was established to distinguish changes in the North 
End due to C3 from other factors. To this end, both temporal and spatial controls were used. The temporal 
control group allowed for the comparison of quality of life indicators before and after the implementation 
of C3. The advantage of this control is that it is inherent in the data that spans 2007–2014, as C3 
commenced in the fall of 2009. The disadvantage was that C3 is not the only factor that affected metrics in 
this time period. To isolate the effects of other factors, a spatial control was utilized and the North End was 
analyzed relative to the entirety of the city of Springfield. This case study adds current data to a prior 
unpublished study done by students at Harvard University. 
122 Stafford, Chandola, and Marmot, “Association between Fear of Crime and Mental Health,” 2076. 
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excess violence, graffiti, and litter can negatively affect one’s health due to the stress 
induced from chronic exposure to disorder.123  
A corresponding improvement in general health should appear in the North End if 
the implementation of C3 has been actually reducing the incidents of crime there. Crime-
related medical calls were analyzed in an attempt to shed light on the community’s state 
of health. Records from American Medical Response (AMR), a private ambulance 
company serving the North End, and Bay State Medical Center, a local level 1 trauma 
center, were collected.124 AMR is a private ambulance service covering the North End 
and provides first responder attention to various medical emergencies. Bay State Medical 
Center’s 24-hour surgical trauma service is the regions foremost medical provider. 
Because C3 activities were aimed at curtailing gang activity, applicable medical 
incidents such as overdoses, gunshot wounds, and stabbings were collected and charted. 
Data for the North End was gathered for each year ranging from 2007 to 2013 (Figure 1). 
Comparing the number of calls for service in each category per month, as a function of 
year, revealed declining trends in the number of calls for overdoses and assaults but not 
so for gunshot wounds and stabbings. These categories showed a slightly climbing trend 
for 2010–2012, before dropping off significantly in 2013. 
123 Ross, and Mirowsky, “Neighborhood Disadvantage, Disorder, and Health,” 272. 
124 Email from Nancy Morrissey, Communications Manager, American Medical Response, “C3 Stats” 
September 19, 2014; Baystate Medical Center, KAS PEN Injuries Report (Springfield, MA: Baystate 
Medical Center, 2011–2013).  
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Figure 1.  Ambulance calls for service in the North End from 2007–2013.133  
133 William Christeson, and Sanford Newman, Caught in the Crossfire: Arresting Gang Violence by Investing in Kids (Washington, DC: Fight Crime: 

























                                                          
The AMR data may have not been complete, as it may not have captured all gang 
activity since individuals involved may not request an ambulance for fear of police 
involvement, and they may self-ambulate to the local emergency room (ER) as a result. 
To circumvent this shortcoming, gunshot wounds and stabbings reported directly to Bay 
State Medical Center’s ER1 were collected per capita and plotted by year ranging from 
2007 to 2013 (Figure 2). Relative to the Springfield Trauma Center data that contained all 
instances reporting there from throughout the entire city, the North End exhibited the 
same trends of gunshot wounds and stabbings (with the exception of 2013). This would 
seem to indicate that C3 had little to no impact on gunshot wounds and stabbings, but it 
certainly a clear impact on assaults and overdoses.  
1 Ibid. 
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2. Economy  
An informed estimate of the economic cost of gang crimes cannot be made 
because gang crimes are not routinely and systematically recorded by most law 
enforcement agencies. Therefore, the proportion of all crimes attributable to gangs is 
unknown. In addition, the medical and financial consequences of gang violence are often 
overlooked. The total volume of crime is estimated to cost Americans $655 billion each 
year,135 and gangs are responsible for a substantial proportion of this. Gangs in the 
United States have long had a significant economic crime impact.136 
In 2008, the City of Springfield Office of Planning and Economic Development 
was advised by an economic assessment report that 33 percent of small businesses in 
Springfield reported that neighborhood crime was the top inhibitor to their growth.137 In 
addition, 48 percent of respondents reported that theft/petty crime limited the success of 
their business.138 Therefore, one can conclude that businesses could suffer in areas with 
high gang activity, like the North End. Based upon this assumption, it would seem that if 
C3 were effectively reducing gang presence and activity in the North End, an 
improvement in business activity should present itself.  
There is a direct correlation between middle class business ownership and income 
equality to the stability of any community.139 This would indicate that an increase in the 
number of business registrations would signal that the economic health of the North End 
has improved as a result of C3. In order to check this hypothesis, the number of business 
registrations in all of Springfield was compared against the number of business 
registrations in the North End (see Figure 3).140  
135 Ibid.    
136 Al Valdez, Gangs: A Guide to Understanding Street Gangs, 3rd ed. (San Clemente, CA: Law Tech 
Pub. Co, 2000), 562; Bureau of Justice Assistance, Urban Street Gang Enforcement (Washington, DC: 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997), iii.    
137 Goodman, and Modzelewski, City of Springfield Economic Assessment Project. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Alesina, and Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” 1203. 
140 “Business List” received from Springfield City (Massachusetts) clerk, August 1, 2014. 
42 
                                                          
  









































 2007       2008       2009       2010       2011        2012       2013  
43 
New business registrations in the North End and Springfield were normalized by 
population and tallied per year. The trends in business registrations in the North End 
paralleled the trends in Springfield and no appreciable increase in business registrations 
seem to have appeared since the implementation of C3 was noted. However, several 
different factors could impact this data. In addition, limited real estate suitable for 
business in the North End could impede improvement.141 Also not included is the fact 
that the North End has an exuberant informal economy.142 Many of these businesses are 
not registered with the city and some, including smaller food vendors and retailers, have 
been doing business in the North End for more than a decade.143 Therefore, any trends in 
the informal economy would not be included or be represented.  
Another avenue to explore in the overall state of the economy in the North End 
was to look at average home values over the past seven years. The values for both the 
North End and all of Springfield were collected and tabulated from 2007–2013.144 
Between 2007 and mid-2008, the average home values in the North End were consistent 
with the rest of Springfield (Figure 4). However, in mid-2008 until mid-2009, North End 
home values fell more abruptly than the rest of Springfield.145 However, despite an 
overall downward trend citywide in mid-2009 until late 2010, there was a surprising 
uptick of North End home values. This trend was not paralleled by the home values 
throughout the rest of Springfield. In all fairness, it should be noted that this upward 
slope began before C3 commenced and other explanations must also be considered. Late 
2011 saw a more drastic drop in the North End, which finally bottomed out in early 2012. 
By mid-2012 the property values again began to mirror those of the rest of the city. If C3 
had any responsibility for closing the gap in values between mid-2010 and mid-2011, that 
trend was lost for the remainder of the time studied.   
141 Kumar, Informal Microenterprise in the North End Community. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 




                                                          
 
Figure 4.  Average home values in the North End and Springfield from 2007–2013.146 
 
146 Kathryn A. Chandler et al., Students’ Reports of School Crime: 1989 and 1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs 
and U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, 1998), http://www.zillow.com/springfield-ma-01107/home-values/, 4, 7, 













































                                                          
Several projects over the past several years have contributed to an influx of 
capital into the North End. For example, the Borinquen Apartment project in 2009 
invested $8.1 million to rehabilitate 41 housing units in the North End.147 In addition, the 
city of Springfield’s North End Improvement Project invested another several million 
dollars to improve roadways and sidewalks on Main Street. Lastly, Baystate Medical 
Center opened its new $300 million facility in the North End, dubbed the “Hospital of the 
Future,” in February of 2012.148 These improvements to the neighborhood, more than 
likely, provide a reasonable explanation for the 2009–2010 rise in property values. 
Interpretation of the data collected shows mixed evidence for the economic efficacy of 
C3. It is more likely that the property values show greater sensitivity to changes in the 
national economy and other complicated factors than to the advent of C3.  
3. Youth and Education  
In areas where they have a substantial presence, youth gangs are linked with 
serious delinquency problems in elementary and secondary schools in the United 
States.149 This study of data gathered in the School Crime Supplement to the 1995 
National Crime Victim Survey documented several examples. First, there is a strong 
correlation between gang presence in schools and both guns in schools and availability of 
drugs in school. Second, higher percentages of students report knowing a student who 
brought a gun to school when students report gang presence (25 percent) than when 
gangs were not present (eight percent).150 Third, students who report that any drugs 
(marijuana, cocaine, crack, etc.) are readily available at school are much more likely to 
report gangs at their school (35 percent) than those who say that no drugs are available 
147 Michael McAuliffe, “Borinquen Apartment Rehab Project in Springfield’s North End to Receive 
Federal Stimulus Funds,” The Republican, November 25, 2009, 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/11/borinquen_apartment_rehab_proj.html; Peter Goonan, 
“Springfield Borinquen Apartments Rehab Praised by Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick and Others,” The 
Republican, August 27, 2010, 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2010/08/springfield_borinquen_apartmen.html     
148 Jim Kinney, “Baystate Health Opens MassMutual Wing, the ‘Hospital of the Future’ for 
Springfield,” The Republican, February 28, 2012, http://www.masslive.com/business-
news/index.ssf/2012/02/baystate_opens_massmutual_wing_the_long-.html    
149 Kathryn A. Chandler et al., Students’ Reports of School Crime: 1989 and 1995, 4, 7, 12.    
150 Internal document, Springfield School Department Records, Springfield, Massachusetts. 
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(14 percent). Fourth, the presence of gangs more than doubles the likelihood of violent 
victimization at school (nearly eight percent versus three percent). The presence of street 
gangs at school also can be very disruptive to the school environment because they may 
not only create fear among students but also increase the level of violence in schools.151 
Gang presence is also an important contributor to overall levels of student victimization 
at school.152 
The Springfield Public School System (SPS) reports that approximately 2,000 
students (including teenagers) live in the North End.153 Meanwhile, the assertion by the 
MSP Special Projects Team is that the majority of crimes in the North End are either 
directly or indirectly due to posses that involve young males from ages 14 to 19.154 It 
would make sense then, that since a significant portion of North End’s residents are of 
school age, taking a look at their behavior while in school would be an important metric.  
a. Truancy in North End Schools  
The improvement of school attendance provides positive alternatives for potential 
young gang members and can lead to reduced gang violence.155 So looking at North End 
school truancy rates might be a valid indicator of neighborhood gang activity. Due to 
their close location to the North End, two schools, Brightwood Elementary School and 
Chestnut Middle School, were evaluated. Brightwood elementary currently has 358 
students, 75 percent of whom live in the North End while 40 percent of Chestnut Middle 
School’s 847 students reside in the North End.156 The method of measuring school 
151 John H. Laub, and Janet L. Lauritsen, “The Interdependence of School Violence with 
Neighborhood and Family Conditions,” in Violence in American Schools: A New Perspective, eds. Delbert 
S. Elliott, Beatrix A. Hamburg, and Kirk R. Williams (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 144.    
152 James C. Howell, and James P. Lynch, Youth Gangs in Schools (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000), 1.    
153 “Chestnut Street Middle (02810310),” Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/profiles/student.aspx?orgcode=02810310&orgtypecode=6& DOE.MASS.Edu    
154 Stafford, Chandola, and Marmot, “Association between Fear of Crime and Mental Health,” 2076. 
155 Eric J. Fritsch, Tory J. Caeti, and Robert W. Taylor, “Gang Suppression through Saturation Patrol 
and Aggressive Curfew and Truancy Enforcement: A Quasi-Experiment Test of the Dallas Anti-Gang 
Initiative,” Crime & Delinquency 45, no. 1 (1999): 133.    
156 “Chestnut Street Middle (02810310).” 
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truancy was by totaling the number of days a student has an unexcused or illegal absence 
from school and dividing that number by the total number of possible days the student 
was enrolled (Figure 5).  
48 
  
Figure 5.  Chestnut Middle School truancy rates from 2007–2013.157 
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Truancy rates since the implementation of C3 reveal a downward trend for 
Chestnut Middle School since the 2008–2009 academic years. Truancy rates for 
Brightwood Elementary School showed a downward trend starting in the 2007–2008 
school year (Figure 6) but saw a nearly 50 percent increase from the 2009–2010 to the 
2010–2011 school years. Overall though, there seems to be positive signs that there was 
an indication of improved school attendance in response to C3.  
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b. Delinquency in Schools by North End Students  
How children are behaving once in school is another metric worthy of 
investigation. To study this, reports of violence and drug activity that North End students 
engage in during school hours were tallied. These data were collected for middle schools 
and high schools that contain North End students.159 High school delinquency data from 
five nearby schools were examined.160  
The information collected was screened so that only North End students were 
counted, since the schools include students from various neighborhoods. The number of 
violent and drug-related incidents from the two middle schools in the North End and the 
five nearby high schools were combined to reveal the total amount of delinquent activity 
attributed to North End students. When comparing reported incidents each year, a 
decreasing trend in violent activities was very apparent in the middle school. The high 
schools showed a significant drop in violent activity immediately following the 
implementation of C3, and drug activities appear to have remained consistent at only one 





                                                          
 
Figure 7.  Middle School violence and drug activity 2007–2013.161      
 
 
































































                                                          
In addition to the advent of C3, other factors may have contributed to the decrease 
over the last few years, including a truce created by two gangs in Commerce High 
School, who agreed to suspend fighting on school grounds and during school hours. 
Furthermore, a citywide school uniform policy was instituted in the 2008–2009 academic 
year, and both administrators at each school and officers stationed in the schools said 
they saw a marked decrease in violence as a result of this policy.  
c. After School Programs  
After school programs have also been shown to have a significant impact on the 
behavior of city youth and participation in after school programs can deter violent 
behavior.162 In the North End, 24 youths that had formally been identified as gang 
members or aspiring gang members have been placed in General Educational 
Development (GED) classes or assisted in securing employment opportunities since C3 
began in 2009.163 Another successful partnership has been with the Student Trooper 
Program offered by the State Police and held as an in resident program at the State Police 
Academy. Participation in this program exposes city youths to the demands of police 
training and serves to foster positive relationships between the community and the police 
that serve them. 
4. Politics in the North End  
Community politics is not a technique; it is an ideology and a system for ideas to 
allow social change. It is very important for the community to actively participate 
politically. It has been proven that the political climate has direct ties to the effectiveness 
of the police force in combating organized crime,164 and a community’s trust in an 
elected official is positively correlated with how local that individual is to the 
162 James C. Fraser, Juvenile Structured Day and Alternative Learning Programs: Impact and Process 
Study (Chapel Hill, NC: Center for Urban & Regional Studies, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 
2004), 7, 69.    
163 New North Citizen’s Council Representative, Springfield, MA. 
164 William G. Hundley, “Nature of Interstate Organized Crime and Problems in Law Enforcement,” 
Notre Dame Law Review 38, no. 6 (1963): 628.    
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community.165 Furthermore, political endorsement of the police positively affects public 
opinions of law enforcement.166 The political history of Springfield over the past 50 
years was viewed. The decision by then Mayor Charles Ryan in the 1960s to change the 
city’s representation from ward to an at-large system, no longer guaranteed geographic 
locations representation, but resulted in the election of nine city council members 
receiving votes from the entire city of Springfield.167 In short, the North End could not 
vote for a North End representative. Representation for the North End became more 
disproportionate as the region became more Hispanic,168 and over 30 years passed until 
the region’s first Hispanic representative was elected to the Massachusetts legislature in 
1999.169  
Ward representation was reinstituted in 2010.170 In the 2011 election, voter 
registration continued to increase and four Latino City Council representatives were 
elected, one of who was from the North End.171 These factors would seem to indicate 
increasing neighborhood involvement and trust in politics, ultimately pointing to 
increased legitimacy of government officials in the community. Voter registration 
continued to rise for the 2013 elections (Figure 9), and although there was a lower voter 
turnout, that may be an indication of the lack of a popular contested race. 
165 Irving A. Spergel, “The Violent Gang Problem in Chicago: A Local Community Approach,” 
Social Service Review 60, no. 1 (March, 1986): 96.    
166 Thomas D. Stucky, “Local Politics and Police Strength,” Justice Quarterly 22, no. 2 (2005): 144.    
167 Mike Plaisance, “Ward Representation to Become Reality in Springfield Again,” The Republican, 
March 22, 2009, http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/03/ward_representation_to_become.html.    
168 Green, “Springfield, Massachusetts: Old Hill, Six Corners, and the South End Neighborhoods,” 6. 
169 General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “The 188th General Court of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts—Cheryl A. Coakley-Rivera,” The General Court, accessed October 3, 
2014, https://malegislature.gov/People/Profile/car1       
170 Plaisance, “Ward Representation to Become Reality in Springfield Again.” 
171 “The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Election Night Results—November 8th, 2011 City 
Election,” City of Springfield, Massachusetts, accessed September 19, 2012, http://www3.springfield-
ma.gov/elections/elect-201111080.0.html      
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Figure 9.  Voter activity in the North End from 2007–2013.172 
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5. Housing 
The crime level in a neighborhood can be closely linked to the quality of its 
housing. It has been shown that greater socioeconomic diversity in a housing complex 
can be linked to reduced crime rates.173 The average annual household income in the 
North End is less than $22,000, and most residents are renters that live in Section Eight 
housing that is government subsidized. In the densely populated North End, the 
population distribution of renters and of Hispanic residents overlaps.174 This correlation 
has been linked to Section Eight housing.175 The Edgewater Apartments that are located 
at 101 Lowell Street is the largest rental property in the North End, and as the only high-
rise in the North End, it is the most densely populated area in the neighborhood, housing 
over 2,000 residents. 
Since 2010, 101 Lowell has been subject to six kinetic operations resulting in 
more than 60 arrests and numerous weapons and drug seizures. Narcotics related crimes 
account for 90 percent of arrests made there.176 This gives 101 Lowell the title of holding 
the highest crime density in the North End and the obvious focal point for law 
enforcement efforts.  
6. Crime  
Measuring the actual incidents of neighborhood crime is the most direct 
barometer of C3’s effects on the North End. The reporting and recording of criminal 
events is typically divided into separate categories, which include calls for service, 
incidents, and arrests. The overall combination gives a snapshot of a community’s state 
of criminal activity (see Figure 10). 
 
173 Mark L. Joseph, Robet J. Chaskin and Henry S. Webber, “The Theoretical Basis for Addressing 
Poverty through Mixed-Income Development,” Urban Affairs Review 42, no. 3 (January, 2007): 387.  
174 Ibid.  
175 Juan Gerena, Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing (City of Springfield, MA: Springfield 
Office of Planning & Economic Development, 2005): 22–23.    
176 Internal document, Springfield Police Department Records, Springfield, Massachusetts. 
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Basically, a call for service is a request for police presence. Upon an officer’s 
arrival, one of three courses of action will be taken. (1) If the officer finds no evidence of 
crime or suspicious activity, no written report is produced. (2) If the officer finds 
evidence of a crime but finds no suspect to arrest, then an incident report will be filed. (3) 
Lastly, if evidence and the suspect who committed the crime are obtainable, an arrest will 
be made. Independent of a call for service, an officer on patrol may witness a crime and 
either write an incident report or make an arrest. In order to analyze crime, all four data 
types from 2007–2013 for the North End were collected.  
7. Violent Crime in the C3 Area 
Crimes within the North End that were directly affected by the C3 initiative were 
compiled (see Table 1).   
Table 1.   Incidents of C3-related violent crimes in Brightwood  
2007–2013.177 
Crimes 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Aggravated 21 20 20 23 22 14 18 
Arson 0 2 2 3 2 0 2 
Larceny 37 34 27 35 41 39 46 
Mal Dam 66 56 59 37 44 21 41 
Threats/Intimidation 32 38 36 35 38 38 39 
B&E 28 30 28 29 28 24 26 
M/V Theft 12 7 11 12 20 12 13 
Murder 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Robbery 3 3 0 5 4 4 10 
Weapons  1 4 4 4 9 5 0 
Totals 200 194 187 183 208 157 196 
 
Calls for service in the North End significantly fluctuated between 2007 and 
2009, and there was an uptick in numbers following the commencement of C3 policing in 
2009.178 This could signal that the police were building legitimacy in the neighborhood 




                                                          
crime remained high in 2011 and the downward trend in calls for service in 2012 and 
2013 could indicate an actual decline in criminal activity due in part to the efforts of C3. 
Drug related arrests in the North End included kinetic operations run by the MSP and the 
SPD, and this indicated a nearly three-fold increase between 2010 and 2011 (Figure 12). 
When isolating C3 directly affected crimes (Figure 11), the incidents were virtually 
unchanged or only trending down slightly between 2007 and 2010 and rose in 2011. 
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The trends in arrests and calls for service suggest that the community is beginning 
to take ownership and responsibility for reporting crime, which has ultimately led to more 
arrests and calls for service. 
 
Figure 12.  Drug arrests in Brightwood 2007–2013. 
Gang involvement and control of the retail drug trade poses a serious threat to 
public safety and stability in many mid-size cities because such distribution activities are 
routinely associated with lethal violence.179 Violent disputes over the control of drug 
territory and collection of drug debts frequently occur among gangs. A review of the 
drug-related arrests in Brightwood showed a significant reduction in drug arrests 
immediately following the implementation of C3 but then a drastic spike in 2011, which 
was due to the previously mentioned kinetic operations conducted by law enforcement 
during that year. Overall, after the sweep of 2011, drug arrests seem to be trending 
downward since the implementation of C3. 
179 National Gang Intelligence Centre, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment—Emerging Trends 
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8. Litter and Graffiti  
A trash and graffiti free neighborhood can be related to resident’s perceptions of 
safety. Litter and vandalism lead to the perception of increased crime180 and are often 
common in communities with increased incidence of crime.181 Graffiti not only affects 
the appearance of a neighborhood, but it is also important to the function of gangs.182 It 
can display in code information such as where to buy drugs or where homicides have 
occurred, and it also marks the territory held by different or rival gangs. Tracking the 
incidents of graffiti can be a direct measure of gang presence. Therefore, if C3 has had an 
impact on the presence of gangs, one would expect to see a measurable drop in the litter 
and graffiti of the neighborhood (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13.  Graffiti reports per square mile for the North End.  
180 LaGrange, Ferraro, and Supancic, “Perceived Risk and Fear of Crime,” 311.  
181 Wilson, and Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” 29. 






























                                                          
Incidents of graffiti and litter indices were provided by the City of Springfield 
Department of Public Works, whose records originated from a variety of both public and 
private sources.183 Graffiti records included date and location of each instance, whereas 
litter indices were maintained as part of the “Keep America Beautiful” initiative.184 
Teams of four or five surveyors continuously travel the city, observe litter, and assign 
each neighborhood a score. These scores range from one—clean, to four—extremely 
littered. These scores are tabulated together to form the litter index.  
Plotting graffiti incidents per square mile by year for both the North End and 
Springfield revealed a considerable spike in 2009. However, the high incidence of graffiti 
in the North End was subsequently diminished by nearly 68 percent by 2011.185 That 
trend continued drastically downward until the present day here in 2014 where the North 
End and the rest of the city are almost even. Next, graffiti instances for each month were 
assessed and revealed highly variable data for the North End (Figure 14). July 2009 and 
January 2012 were outliers for the North End because during this time, a few 
pathological graffiti artists were overactive and raised overall averages.186 The takeaway 
from the data provided was that compared to the city of Springfield, the North End had 
steep upward trend from 2007 to 2009, which reversed from 2009 to 2014.  
183 Author received from August 13, 2014 from Michael Cass, Springfield City Department of Public 





                                                          
 
Figure 14.  Graffiti reports per square mile for the North End and Springfield 
per (A) year and per (B) month. 
Since C3 began in late 2009, there has only been two months with 10 or more 
instances of graffiti per square mile, and the number of months without any graffiti has 
risen. Graffiti-free months have increased considerably from 2007 to 2014, a trend unique 































































































To analyze litter data, the indices for each year from 2007 to 2014 were 
tabulated.187 The Brightwood section of the North End where C3 was implemented in 
2009 was the focus. Brightwood was compared to the nearby neighborhood of Memorial 
Square as well as the entirety of Springfield. Both other regions are outside of C3’s area 
of focus (Figure 16).  
187 Ibid. 
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Prior to 2009, Brightwood was typically as littered as the rest of the city, if not 
more. Since then, it has always fared better than the rest of Springfield and neighboring 
Memorial Square. In fact, in 2011 and 2014, it was the single cleanest neighborhood in 
the entire city. While graffiti in the North End still slightly surpasses that of Springfield 
as a whole, there are fewer instances since C3 commenced, and the number of months 
without any graffiti has increased. In addition, litter in the North End has dropped 
measurably compared to the rest of Springfield, a trend not paralleled by Memorial 
Square. All indications are that the physical appearance of the neighborhood where C3 is 
focused on is improving. Because neighborhood appearance is linked to feelings of 
public safety,188 these conditions suggest that C3 is having positive effects on the overall 
quality of life in this community.  
B. ASSESSMENT OF C3  
The metrics analyzed thus far have been completely based on quantitative 
indicators. This is typically how COIN-based strategies graded.189 The recognized 
standard has been using two categories to assess this data. The first is an effects-based 
assessment that requires researchers to track the results of specific events in the target 
area over time and build a picture of campaign momentum. The second is pattern and 
trends analysis that identifies various metrics for study and identifies trends in each over 
time. That is why the metrics two years preceding C3 and four to five years since the 
implementation was collected. This classic COIN approach is similar to the methods used 
in this study. It must be remembered though, that the debate continues regarding the 
correct method of analyzing COIN efforts, and no single model has yet been deemed 
appropriate.190  
In conclusion, pattern and trends analysis alone will never determine what metrics 
are important to a given community. It is conceivable that something important in one 
location may be irrelevant in another. It is through these observations, though, that the 
188 Wilson, and Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” 29. 
189 Few, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Metrics in Small Wars.” 
190 Ibid. 
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policy recommendations for further implementation of C3 are partially based. Therefore, 
it is important to form opinions on statistical data that shows positive trends. Residents 
understand the area better than an outside observer but this would require a means of 
analysis that would enlist their expertise. However, qualitative research was not included 
in this academic review. The author hopes that a qualitative researcher will assist in 
future updates to this study with a blend of qualitative evaluation measures. 
Viewing the current North End environment through the lens of the accepted 
counterinsurgency strategy of clear (ridding an area of insurgency leadership and quick 
impact efforts to degrade their legitimacy), hold (securing the area against further 
insurgency activity while building legitimacy and working to stabilize the population), 
and build (effectively immunizing the community against further insurgent activity by 
increasing its ability to provide its own security, economic stability and growth, and the 
development of civil order and governance),191 it would appear that C3 policing in the 
North End can generally be considered in the hold phase. Infrequent and sporadic 
instances of gang activity continue, while indicators of the community’s stabilization 
against the escalation of gang violence show slow but positive gains.  
A review of the results of this case study revealed some expected and unexpected 
outcomes. Although there were some clear and definitive trends, there were also 
indiscernible ones. Most of the economic and some of the health data were unsuccessful 
in showing positive trends. However, examples of school impacts, such as truancy rates 
and delinquency, show positive signs. Looking at crime through arrests and calls for 
service reveal a neighborhood that is becoming more involved with law enforcement and 
that perhaps trust and legitimacy is indeed being established since the implementation of 
C3. Increased community involvement was also apparent in the political realm as 
registered voters continued to climb, which is sometimes an indicator of “voting for a 
change.” Lastly, convincing trends were apparent in both instances of graffiti and litter, 
which indicates that this community is making it less hospitable for gang activity to 
develop and flourish. 
191 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24), 5–18. 
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IV. COIN IN POLICING IN THE WORLD 
The primary objective of any COIN operation is to help set the conditions for a 
stable environment and to separate disruptive subjects or groups from their cause and 
support. Effective police and law enforcement activities in COIN may or may not be 
applicable to some because its origins lie in colonial warfare, and its results are extremely 
mixed. Essential to this objective and are the primary means by which the state maintains 
control over the illegitimate and illicit transactions of bad actors. Important lessons can 
be learned from other countries experiences (Figure 17). 
 
                   
 
Figure 17.  Massachusetts State Police, British Armed Forces, and Indian 
Defence 
This chapter presents two case studies that look at the effects of law enforcement 
and policing efforts on the results of COIN efforts. It is important to evaluate past 
applications of COIN policing applications to observe relevant lessons for strategists, 
leaders, and planners at both the strategic and operational levels. A study of historical 
cases such as these can sometimes provide new and vital perspectives on the deployment 
of new strategies and perhaps help to improve organizational performance. Highlighted 
are the aspects of a contemporary COIN model of policing and law enforcement action 
undertaken by two democratic nations in recent history: 
• More than 30 years of COIN operations in Northern Ireland during the 
Troubles (imperial policing). 
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• The policing and law enforcement model used to defeat Naxal insurgents 
in central India.  
A. COIN POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969–2007 (THE 
TROUBLES)  
Ireland achieved independence in 1922, but six of the nine northern counties of 
Ulster remained under governance of the United Kingdom (UK). This divided the 
population of Northern Ireland between Catholics and Protestants. This caused religious 
tensions between both groups:  
The Protestants, as loyalists (or unionists), advocated for political 
affiliation with the UK.  
Whereas the Catholics, as the republicans (or nationalists), stood for the 
unification of all Ireland and as such, created a political organization 
known as Sinn Fein and an insurgent component, the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA).192 
Many lessons were learned by the operations on the part of the British during this 
time, and those found applicable to the present day application of COIN in this thesis, 
derived from official government briefings, follow:193  
If possible, use a campaign plan to resolve unity issues—that is, imple-
ment effective command and control. Control measures such as tactical 
and operational boundaries should be similar, and if at all possible, related 
to those of any overall coordinating intelligence body. Establish joint 
committees or organizations at all levels.  
Develop early in the campaign the legal requirements for operational 
framework as the military begins to act more like police (constabulary) 
and the police become more military-like.  
Special training is required to prepare for policing operations in COIN 
environments. There should be consideration for COIN training to deal 
with policing techniques for the units chosen to operate in urban 
insurgencies. Comprehensive and dedicated training of the police on 
192 Andrew Silke, “Bitter Harvests: The Royal Ulster Constabulary’s Response to Paramilitary 
Vigilantism in Northern Ireland,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 9, no. 2 (2000): 1–5.    
193 Operation BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland (London: Ministry of 
Defence, 2006), http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf, 4–1–
4-13. 
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aspects of COIN and operating with non-governmental organizations will 
help the two succeed.  
These policing and law enforcement lessons learned indicated that investigative 
functions and intelligence gathering should form the basis of an effective COIN strategy 
during irregular acts of terrorism from urban guerrillas.194 
It is true that law enforcement will tend to become more military-like with COIN. 
This could result in communities feeling alienated from law enforcement due to police 
focusing on COIN tasks at the expense of ordinary crime, the result being the community 
losing its support for the police. To counter this, the public needs to be reassured by the 
government that police and law enforcement agencies are still focused on crime 
prevention through community policing, even during COIN operations. Failure to do so 
could result an unintended result of vigilantism.195 
B. COIN POLICING IN INDIA 1967–2011 (THE NAXAL INSURGENCY) 
This next example of a COIN policing is a study from field research on the police 
operations in central India to engage the Naxal insurgents. The difference in this 
particular approach was that policing and law enforcement in COIN represented a direct 
strategy, the police and law enforcement, not the military, were the main actors. 
Discussions and interviews with key police and law enforcement intelligence 
personnel resulted in critical discoveries related to police operations in COIN 
environments (from the government perspective):196 
Some COIN operations require military solutions, but overall the police 
model is preferred, using minimum force as the doctrinal template. 
The preferred method for overall police unity of command is to emplace 
an overall district police inspector or inspector general to lead the COIN 
effort, backed by the national police and in support of local and regional 
police. 
194 Lindsay Clutterbuck, “Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police 
Function,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 114.    
195 Silke, “Bitter Harvests,” 27.    
196 Celeski, Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line, 75.    
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A variety of police units can be used in a COIN environment. Police must 
be multi-tiered to cover the district, and territorial areas.  
The sharing of intelligence requires remembering the difference between 
what the military and the police need for their own uses. The differences 
will help reconcile tension between them. The military often is looking for 
tactical intelligence to defeat insurgents, while the police are looking for 
investigative, forensic style information to build cases and make arrests. 
Understanding differences aids in the collection, analysis, and distribution 
of the raw data to be shared between the two forces.  
Leaders (who include politicians) must be seen frequently visiting the 
neighborhoods to keep an understanding of what is occurring in the 
environment. Leadership cannot manage and call the shots from afar. 
The policing model for COIN within the district was considered effective by the 
senior police representatives. Their thoughts were that the people relate to local police; 
they are familiar. The population believes that the police share their same dangers 
because they live there, plus the police have the local understanding and background of 
every situation. The largest attribute of a police-led COIN effort are that the police have a 
vast historical record of all the activities of their areas (e.g., who has been arrested, who 
lives there). This critical knowledge and information becomes the basis of their 
intelligence. 
C. COIN POLICING IN CONTEXT 
Policing in the North End of Springfield had fallen into a reactive approach to law 
enforcement due to waning manpower, rising calls for service, and the overall philosophy 
of policing in urban environments. Comparatively, good practices in the UK and India 
offer a proactive approach focusing on collection and analysis of intelligence, social data, 
engaging the community, and building trust through partnerships to support ongoing 
investigations aimed at identifying criminals and crime trends. 
Over the past several decades, policing the North End of Springfield has relied on 
a community policing based approach, but this technique has been revealed as resource 
intensive, overly bureaucratic, and difficult to assess. This approach utilized a short-term 
and tactical level of intelligence that addressed the immediate problem. It worked well for 
some issues, but it was not strategic in nature and fell short of being integrated into the 
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entire agency’s way of doing business. However, this was a start and the department has 
begun to realize the importance of being more proactive as opposed to reactive. A 
comparison between Community Policing and C3 Policing is in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Past Springfield and Massachusetts State Police Community 
Policing versus COIN Policing197 
Principals of Community Policing 
 
-Philosophy and organizational strategy 
-Commitment to community empowerment 
-Decentralized and personalized policing 
-Immediate and long-term proactive 
  Problem solving 
-Ethics, legality, responsibility and trust 
-Expanding the police mandate 
-Helping those with special needs 
-Grassroots creativity and support 
-Internal change 
-Building for the future 
 
Philosophy 


























Principals of COIN-Inspired Policing 
 
-Legitimacy is crucial to achieving our goals 
-You must understand the environment 
  (must know the ground truth) 
-Unity of effort is essential 
-Intelligence drives operations 
-Prepare for a long-term commitment 
-Local factors are primary 
-Security under the rule of law is essential 





-Utilizes existing resources 
 
One of the biggest contentions by other agencies and academics alike after first 
hearing of C3 policing is: “That’s just community policing. We’re doing that now.” I can 
only surmise that they come to this conclusion by focusing only on the community 
meetings aspect of the two programs. Community policing in Springfield was 
implemented in the early 1990s during an atmosphere of economic growth and never 
addressed attacking the root causes of gangs and drug dealing. Police could identify “hot 
spots” and “nuke” the problem by flooding the area with officers. When federal funding 
for additional police officers dried up, most departments became shorthanded. As a 
result, they were no longer able to respond with the same numbers of officers.  
Community policing and C3 are two very distinct and different tools. One is not 
better than the other; they are different. To say one is better than the other is like saying a 
screwdriver is better than a hammer—it all depends on what the intended job is. They are 
197 Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing,” MSP C3 Policing, 
accessed November 4, 2014, http://mspc3policing.com/?page_id=13     
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designed for different end states. The 10 bullet comments, or principles, that are under 
community policing come from the Department of Justice (DOJ) website.198 They are all 
philosophical tenants of what to do in community policing. It leaves a lot of leeway for 
the chief or the person running it to interpret the philosophy. I would argue that 
community policing is a good tool in communities that want to work with the police. 
Places where there are home owners, businesses, low crime, and where the population 
looks at police officers respectfully. Community policing is not an effective tool in a 
community that has negative connotations of the police, and one in which the population 
does not want to engage with the police. There seems to be no action arm to community 
policing. In addition, there is no intelligence cycle to target the nefarious actors. 
Community policing has philosophical approaches like “commitment to 
community empowerment.”199 What is the community being empowered to do? It 
doesn’t say. If that was a tenant in C3 policing, it might say “empower the community to 
overthrow gang members” for instance. It would be more specific. The principals of C3 
and COIN are very specific. It is saying that things must be done differently. Intelligence 
drives operations in C3. It is telling the officer, the chief, or the patrolman that the 
operations are driven off of the intelligence that are garnished from the community.  
It also states under the principles of C3 Policing that “gangs must be separated 
from their cause and support.”200 Their cause is the gang lifestyle, the guns, the drugs, 
and running a gang. Their support base is the passive support from the community. 
So we have two different tools for two different problem sets. So outwardly, it 
looks to some that C3 is community policing because there is a lot of community 
engagement but the difference is the C3 strategy is to garnish information that can be 
turned into intelligence to do targeting at the same time mobilizing and educating the 
community members so that they, on their own, willfully turn against the gang members.  
 
198 Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing.” 
199 Gayle Fisher-Stewart, U.S. Department of Justice, Community Policing Explained: A Guide for 
Local Governments, 2007, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/publications/cp_explained.pdf, 29.  
200 Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing.”  
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There is no plan in community policing to do that. It is “empowerment,” 
“expanding the police Mandate,” and to “help those with special needs.”201 How does 
that attack the gang problem? That is where the two approaches are different. Community 
policing is a philosophy that will be interpreted differently by each department, by each 
chief differently, and executed differently. With C3 policing there is some room for 
interpretation, but it is also very specific. It says “legitimacy is crucial to achieving our 
goals,”202 that is the legitimacy of the police. Rebuilding police legitimacy with the 
population is crucial. It must be built before any gains within the community can be 
made.   
It is unfair to expect the highly motivated good officers or troopers to do C3 
policing when they are not given the tools at the academy. At the academy, they are 
taught criminal law, motor vehicle law, ethics, how to do investigations, reports, patrol 
procedures, defensive tactics, crash investigations, and arrest procedures. What is not 
taught to the officer, and typically does not fall under our skill set is long-term planning 
and how to change the environment.  
D. COMPARATIVE LESSONS 
Comparison of concepts in the UK and India, which relied heavily on COIN 
principals of intelligence-driven products to direct resources, can have an impact on the 
development and emergence of C3 policing. Law enforcement can learn from these past 
accounts to address the new challenges faced in policing economically depressed urban 
environments using intelligence in a more realistic and integrated manner. Again, the key 
benefit that the UK and Indian examples offer is the ability to be proactive instead of 
reactive and to leverage resources to effectively address issues. 
In the examples discussed above, the police in UK and India seek to change the 
social conditions within the target area to address the underlying issues. They seek the 
“ground truth,” not that which is perceived or projected by the government or authority. 




                                                          
Failure to achieve this objective reduces the police to no more than an occupational force, 
similar to the failed application of COIN early during the UK involvement in Northern 
Ireland. Our typical barracks patrol officers currently see themselves as “crime fighters” 
and tend to shun any form of social work. They respond to calls for service from the 
public and see their mission as arresting criminals. The threat of arrest is the dominant 
mode of acquiring compliance from the community. Community members seem to be 
angry at the police for not addressing the issues they see as important. This shows that the 
cultural changes that need to take place are not only with the community, but the policing 
methodology as well. 
The military and the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the UK learned that special 
training is required to prepare for policing operations in COIN environments. There 
should be consideration of COIN training to deal with policing techniques for the units 
chosen to operate in urban insurgencies. Comprehensive and dedicated training of the 
police on aspects of COIN and operating with non-governmental organizations will help 
the two succeed. We currently do not offer these forms of training in our traditional 
policing curriculum. The needed course materials and specialized skills to accomplish the 
mission need to be properly identified should be researched and offered to members 
requesting this assignment. The current success we have seen in C3 policing is based 
largely upon skills that these officers obtained by serving in the armed forces while 
deployed overseas in the global war on terror. However, expansion would require 
additional officers, who have not received this specialized training, and unfortunately the 
training is not currently available through our traditional academy curriculum.  
Both the UK and Indian examples stressed the ability to engage the public to form 
legitimacy of the police and government. The current environment in Springfield is 
lacking in that regard. The low percentage of calls for service compared to the actual 
incidents of crime indicates that the citizenry is reluctant to call the police. The trust and 
confidence in the police must be built before any reasonable impact can take place in the 
community. 
The Springfield Police and Massachusetts State Police must incorporate the entire 
community if we ever expect to change the social landscape. The UK and India learned 
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that the community can become alienated from the police during these campaigns against 
insurgencies or gangs. Furthermore, they learned that they could not focus on COIN at 
the expense of ordinary crime and quality of life issues. On the other hand, the 
Springfield Police and the Massachusetts State Police tend to keep separate from the 
community social agencies that address things like housing, schools, health, and welfare. 
Building better partnerships, like the UK and India did, would help to add legitimacy to 
our stake in these neighborhoods. 
Another common thread in both the UK and Indian models was a public relations 
initiative. These campaigns focused on portraying the police and law enforcement 
agencies as protecting law and order with the support and help of the community. Far too 
often, here in the U.S., we overlook the power of promoting our positive collaboration 
with the public. The steady stream of media tends to only reflect the negative examples of 
interaction between the police and the public. Perhaps adopting methodology of public 
relations campaigns used in India and the UK can be a force multiplier in achieving our 
ultimate goal of the reduction of violent gang crime. 
Both of these examples (Northern Ireland and India) provide important lessons for 
the further development and successful expansion of C3 policing. While these are only 
two examples, strategists and policy makers must continue to research and study various 
historical COIN experiences to form policies on the application of police and law 
enforcement in targeted areas. The overall conclusions about policing and law 
enforcement in COIN described in these two examples are: 
• Effective policing and law enforcement, perceived as legitimate by the 
populace, in consort with other measures implemented by the government 
to improve the quality of life and ensure security, would serve as a 
preemptive or preventative measure against any chance of escalating 
crime.  
• Comprehensive and dedicated training of the police on aspects of COIN 
and operating with non-governmental organizations is vital to help the two 
succeed.  
• Assessments and planning must always take into consideration the roles 
offensive policing and community policing play as an integrated portion of 
the government’s response to crime. 
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• To effectively move police from a community policing posture to an 
intelligence-led policing posture will require paying attention to their 
training and equipment. The capacity to train and enable police is 
increased by incorporating assets from partners within the community 
with a stake in the outcome. 
• Police reserves, community volunteers, auxiliaries, and specialized police 
units are all resources that can be used to expand the capacity of law 
enforcement.  
• A success metric for a COIN end state is when the situation begins to 
revert back to a level of disorder that a society can live with.  
These experiences from the UK and India provide some interesting perspectives 
and insights into the use and application of COIN strategies, tactics, techniques and 
procedures. The lessons learned provide increased knowledge in respect to civil policing 




Although some argue quite convincingly a contradictory view, the violence, drug 
activity, and criminal behavior that we see in Springfield’s North End do not constitute 
an insurgency. Criminal gangs have no ideology beyond their own profit, no political 
aspirations what so ever, and only achieve passive community support through violence 
or intimidation. Gangs are nothing more than basic criminal entities. Some COIN 
principles and practices can, however, support the current law-enforcement strategy 
aimed to detect, deter, and degrade gangs. The effectiveness of these efforts seem to 
depend more on deepening reciprocal trust and building legitimacy in the police than 
perhaps on applying all of the lessons learned overseas during the global war on terror to 
Springfield’s inner city neighborhoods. 
Without a doubt, COIN strategy is a military strategy; however, the basic skills of 
working with and through the community, intelligence driving operations, and 
conducting investigations are all fundamental law enforcement practices. Through many 
conflicts, the military learned and honed these specific skills, eventually applying them 
with success through their special operations communities (e.g., as applied by the Green 
Berets). Now is the time for new ideas and approaches, such as C3 policing that examine 
these practices and create that which has always been missing in community policing: a 
defined strategy to confront criminal street gangs. C3’s COIN gang strategy provides the 
advantage of strong agency and community relationships to identify, target, and remove 
the gangs through the use of intelligence driven operations. When properly administered 
and executed, this strategy of intelligence-driven targeting and operations should be the 
most effective and efficient means to detect, disrupt, degrade, and dismantle criminal 
gang activity in the city of Springfield. 
A. CIVIL-MILITARY FUSION: THE FLIP SIDE OF THE COIN 
At what point in the future do the commando and cop merge? Both travel a 
separate and distinctive path that has slowly been narrowing to a point where at the 
current course of things, they are bound to intersect. The reasonable person would select 
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to take the best practices of each and discard those attributes that tend to cast the civilian 
population as enemy combatants. Critics worry that military methods and mindsets are 
creeping into police practices to the detriment of citizens’ safety and community stability. 
According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), “the militarization of 
domestic law enforcement began in the 1970s with the war on drugs, and has been fueled 
by billions of dollars in federal funding throughout the so-called war on terror.”203 Its 
report also asserts that Massachusetts police departments have been accepting equipment 
from the Department of Defense (DOD) free of charge for many years. This dispersal is 
handled by the U.S. military’s 1033 program,204 which gives used DOD equipment to 
state and local law enforcement for “counter-drug or counter-terrorism activities.”205 
Between 1994 and 2009, 82 police departments and other authorized agencies in 
Massachusetts received 1,068 military weapons from the DOD—including 486 fully 
automatic M-16 machine guns and 564 semi-automatic M-14s.206 West Springfield, 
Massachusetts, population 28,137, got two grenade launchers through the 1033 
program.207 Massachusetts police departments also received five “peacekeeper armored 
vehicles” valued at $1 million, 771 vehicles worth more than $11 million, and large 
marine craft worth $300,000.208 In 2012, Massachusetts agencies requested equipment 
worth over $2 million from the DOD, including night vision goggles, binoculars, 
telescopes, computers, and trucks.209 
203 “Our Homes are Not Battlefields: Reversing the Militarization & Federalization of Local Police in 
Massachusetts,” American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, accessed November 14, 2014, 
http://www.privacysos.org/swat  
204 “1033 Program Overview,” The Official website of the Executive Office of Public Safety and 
Security, accessed October 7, 2014, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/msp/1033-program.html  
205 “Our Homes are Not Battlefields.”  
206 Donovan Slack, “Police Add Assault Riffles across the State.” The Boston Globe, June 3, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/06/03/police_add_assault_rifles_across_the
_state 
207 “Weapons List,” accessed October 7, 2014, 
https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/1033_Weapons_List.pdf 
208 “1103 Program Roster,” accessed October 7, 2014, 
https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/1033_Program_Roster.pdf 
209 “1033 Program Property Books,” accessed September 27, 2014, 
https://privacysos.org/sites/all/files/1033_Program_Property_Book.xls 
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This acquisition of military equipment, including powerful weapons, happens 
without a process for public input. A Boston Globe report210 found that when it surveyed 
12 Massachusetts police departments, not one had informed the public that it was getting 
free military weapons through the 1033 program. That public engagement is crucial 
because not all communities are eager to receive military weapons, even when the DOD 
is giving them away. 
At the writing of this thesis, many in law enforcement are preparing for the public 
response to the pending release of grand jury findings in Ferguson, Missouri. In this case, 
a young man lost his life as the result of a police action. This has vaulted to the forefront 
a public conversation about the law enforcement tactics used during a public safety crisis 
and scrutinizes the military-civil fusion. These concerns are not only legitimate but 
welcomed in a democratic society. These events also reignite the examination of the 
civil-military fusion debate, focusing on the 1033 program, which makes military surplus 
equipment available to local law enforcement agencies. 
The police, who act as the civilian representatives of the law in our communities, 
completely understand the public’s concerns. To this end, Massachusetts State Police 
Colonel Timothy Alben, also a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) alumnus, recently 
wrote in a Boston Herald article, “Assault rifles, while a legitimate and necessary tool for 
serious law enforcement applications, have no place on the front line of any civil 
demonstration in our communities.”211 Understanding that, the Massachusetts State 
Police, as well as other law enforcement agencies across the country, have acquired many 
other pieces from the military beyond just firearms. 
Most of the equipment acquired by the MSP has been valuable items such as night 
vision goggles, personal protection equipment, and commercial grade industrial and 
construction equipment. This includes small unit support vehicles (SUSVs), which have 
been used to help transport residents of flooded towns. Also acquired have been bucket 
loaders, flatbed trailers to haul critical equipment, generators for storm ravaged or 
210 Donovan Slack, “Even Small Localities Got Big Guns,” The Boston Globe, June 15, 2009.    
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disaster stricken communities; and heavy trucks with plows. According to Alben, “Even 
the six Humvee’s the Massachusetts State Police acquired are neither armor-plated nor 
equipped with weapons. These all-terrain vehicles, capable of navigating otherwise 
impassable, swampy or snow-impacted terrain, are utilized almost exclusively for search 
and rescue operations and will never be deployed to a public disturbance of any type.”212  
Another asset portrayed as part of the “militarization” is armored vehicles, which 
are mainly purchased through federal homeland security grant programs—not the 1033 
program.213 These particular vehicles are defensive in nature and designed primarily for 
the protection of police. They are not, and never have been, equipped with mounted guns 
or other lethal instruments predominantly associated with military operations. Instead, 
they are equipped with public address systems to communicate with large crowds or for 
crisis negotiators to calm barricaded subjects as well as armed, distraught individuals. 
They are also used to shuttle tactical teams into volatile and threatening situations where 
they could be facing incoming gunfire.214 
Another commonly criticized observation of the “militarization” is the uniforms 
worn by law enforcement during such disturbances or critical incidents. These uniforms 
are worn in these instances because they are more durable and better suited for the 
situation, rather than to “mimic” soldiers.215 In a crisis response scenario, whether man-
made or natural disaster, these particular uniforms can provide greater protection from 
chemicals, fire, or sharp objects. Most importantly, these uniforms display a badge, 
agency patch, and troopers last name so that officers are easily recognizable as police 
officers, not soldiers. 
How about other things that can be considered “militarization”? Every day in 
emergency rooms across the country, combat medical techniques are saving the lives of 





                                                          
hundreds. Where do did the Boston Trauma Centers learn their skills to treat the Boston 
Marathon bombing victims? That’s right, combat medicine.216 
Here in Massachusetts, “militarization” technology being developed by the 
Army’s Natick Soldiers Center researching new protective technology for soldiers, 
including better body armor, breathing systems, and technology to locate soldiers in a 
critical situation, could be helpful to civilian public safety applications. Technology being 
used today to track soldiers on the battlefield will be used someday to locate the positions 
of firefighters in a burning building. 
The “flip side” is that when Sir Robert Peel first developed his framework for the 
London Metropolitan Police in 1829, he borrowed heavily from the military in both 
organization and administrative structures.217 But most of all, he wanted there to be a 
clear distinction between the police and the military. To that end, the uniforms of the 
London Metropolitan Police (Bobbies) were blue, in contrast with the red uniforms worn 
by the British military. Bobbies were also forbidden to carry guns. 
Our early American policing structure was loosely modeled after Peel’s plan. The 
military’s mission was predicated on the use of force, whereas Peel’s principles of 
policing emphasized crime prevention, public approval, the minimal use of force, and the 
willing cooperation of the public.218 Although the community policing movement had 
drawn heavily from Peel’s principles of policing, which emphasized the importance of 
the relationship between the police and the community they serve, what was the option 
for when gangs thrive in a failed community, one that has lost trust in law enforcement, 
refuses to engage the police, and passively permits gangs to operate? The current drift 
toward some strategic methods inspired by the current “global war on terror” might not 
be the evil form of “militarization” that some are quick to point out. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Karl Bickel, “Will the Growing Militarization of Our Police Doom Community Policing?,” 
Community Policing Dispatch 6, no. 12 (2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-
2013/will_the_growing_militarization_of_our_police_doom_community_policing.asp 
218 “Policing by Consent,” FOI release, December 10, 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent; “Sir Robert Peel’s Principles of Law 
Enforcement, 1829,” accessed October 7, 2014, https://www.durham.police.uk/About-
Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf 
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In sum, “militarization” need not always be viewed in a negative light. However, 
continued civil-military fusion can only successfully exist in an environment where there 
is a strong community—police relationship, recurrent and sustained training, and 
responsible law enforcement leadership.219 The debate over whether there is a “flip side 
of the COIN” or any unintended consequences could only truly be answered by 
conducting interviews and surveys within the community to gain a qualitative analysis. 
After all, seeing the landscape through the lens of those affected, is the only means of an 
accurate account.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recent appointment of a new police commissioner in the city of Springfield 
has prompted the request for a city wide expansion of the C3 Program. Prior to such a 
commitment by the department, the following recommendations are made based upon the 
information revealed in this thesis. 
Recommendation 1: The selection of prospective officers should take into 
account the multidisciplinary skills required of COIN inspired policing, many of which 
may not be obtained in traditional law enforcement training. The current C3 team was 
hand selected based upon prior experience both in law enforcement and military 
deployments, language, and technical skills. The tasks and organization of the team may 
be unique to the mission, tactical situation, and the technical, cultural, and social terrain. 
Therefore, training should be developed and offered to reflect the department’s 
commitment to this initiative if we are expected to entertain its expansion. Failure to 
commit the proper personnel with the appropriate skills, training, and motivation could 
ultimately result in the failure of this proposed expansion. 
Recommendation 2: Invitation and permission from the community regarding 
entry of C3 policing should be sought prior to commencing operations. The 
neighborhood should be the initiator of the contact as opposed to being arbitrarily 
selected by either law enforcement or the city administration. The community must have 
a desired interest in the outcome and be willing to be an active participant in the effort. It 
219 Alben, “The “Militarization” of Police: Another Perspective.” 
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is imperative to its success that the members of C3 are able to identify and work with the 
true local leaders and to enlist the support of local community groups. Building 
legitimacy is crucial to achieving these goals. Ultimately, the ability to mobilize the 
population against the gang problem depends on good relations. Ideally, the end state of 
the process is a re-shaping of the community environment, which makes it inhospitable 
for gangs, drugs, and violent criminal behavior.  
Recommendation 3: For C3 policing to succeed, a multidisciplinary team of law 
enforcement, public health, public works, school officials, and non-government 
organizations should be assembled and mobilized in the planning phases before 
operations commence. This “working group” should conduct a mission analysis and 
develop an “implementation plan” including, but not limited to, the following: 
• Analyze the community’s concerns 
• Analyze the departments mission, intent, and expectations 
• Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks 
• Determine constraints, prohibitions, and restrictions 
• Construct a timeline with stated goals 
• Develop themes and messages (intra-agency, inter-agency, media, and 
public) 
• Establish course of action evaluation criteria (metrics) 
• Conduct a cost analysis to explore the feasibility of implementation 
Recommendation 4: Critics of the nexus of the military and social science 
research and application of military tactics to civilian issues warn that the idea of 
applying a counter-insurgency approach in domestic law enforcement; however, it is 
labeled, risks casting local communities as hostile populations. Over used terms such as 
“the war on crime,” “the war on drugs,” “the war on terror” add to this perception, along 
with articles referring to police calling many urban areas combat or war zones. Every 
effort to promote the positive collaboration and interaction with community leaders and 
residents is essential to promote our message of providing a safe environment through 
police-citizen partnership with an emphasis on mutual trust, integrity, fairness, and 
professionalism. 
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